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INTRODUCTION
In March 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in FTC
v. Actavis, Inc. 1 The Actavis decision, expected later this year, will give
the Court the opportunity to answer the multibillion-dollar question of
whether brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies violate
antitrust laws when they enter into payment agreements to delay generic
drugs from entering the market. 2 The Court’s decision in this case
could have a significant impact on rising health care costs in this
country. 3 The high cost of prescription drugs has put crippling
economic pressure on the U.S. health care system. 4 In 2010, forty-eight
1. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12416).
2. For a summary of Actavis oral arguments, see Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: No Easy
Rule on Drug “Pay For Delay”?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2013/03/argument-recap-no-easy-rule-on-drug-pay-for-delay/. A “brand-name” drug,
also known as a “pioneer drug,” is a drug “marketed under a proprietary, trademark-protected
name.” FDA Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
InformationOnDrugs/ucm079436.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). A “generic” drug is equivalent
to a brand-name drug in dosage, safety, strength, and quality. Id.
3. David Balto, a former Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) policy director, described
Watson as “the health care reform case of 2013.” “There’s no other case that can have as much
impact on reducing health care costs.” Brett Norman, Supreme Court Takes Up Case on Generic
Drugs, POLITICOPRO (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/supreme-courtgeneric-drugs-pay-for-delay-84810.html?hp=r6.
4. See DAVID A. SQUIRES, EXPLAINING HIGH HEALTH CARE SPENDING IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 5 (2012) (finding that the prices for the thirty most
commonly prescribed drugs are one-third higher in the United States than in Canada and
Germany, and more than double the prices in Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, which contributes to unsustainably high health care costs in the United
States); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: TRENDS IN USUAL
AND CUSTOMARY PRICES FOR COMMONLY USED DRUGS 1 (2011) (finding that the average usual
and customary price for brand-name prescription drugs increased six percent each year from
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million Americans sacrificed filling essential drug prescriptions due to
cost, often leading to life-threatening consequences and additional
health care expenses. 5 Although many factors contribute to high drug
prices, collusive settlements between brand-name pharmaceutical
companies and generic drug manufacturers play a major role by
presenting a barrier to lowering drug costs. 6
Brand-name
pharmaceutical companies have long been settling patent litigation by
paying generic manufacturers large sums of money to drop patent
lawsuits, thereby delaying generic drugs from entering the market.7
These settlement arrangements, known as “reverse payments” or “payfor-delay” agreements, 8 derive from the regulatory framework of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
otherwise known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. 9
Though HatchJanuary 2000 through January 2010); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A
PRIMER, KEY INFORMATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT 7 (2012) [hereinafter
2012 KFF REPORT] (reporting that spending on prescription drugs increased one-hundred
fourteen percent from 2000 to 2010).
5. See COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 2010 BIENNIAL HEALTH
INSURANCE SURVEY 13 (2011) (reporting that out of uninsured and insured Americans ages
nineteen to sixty-four, forty-eight million did not fill a prescription due to cost, up sixty-six
percent since 2001); 2012 KFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 23 (finding that twenty-five percent of
families failed to fill a prescription for medicine and seventeen percent cut pills in half or skipped
doses due to cost).
6. See FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS
2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FTC REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112
payfordelayrpt.pdf (reporting that pay-for-delay agreements cost Americans $3.5 billion per
year); Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494–502 (2007) (defining reverse payment
settlements).
7. See FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED
IN FY 2010, A REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC
REPORT] (reporting that reverse payment deals increased by sixty percent in 2010 and involved
combined annual sales of about $9 billion); Scott C. Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006)
[hereinafter Hemphill, Paying for Delay] (explaining the antitrust implications of reverse
payment settlements); Marcy L. Lobanoff, Comment, Anti-Competitive Agreements Cloaked as
“Settlements” Thwart the Purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 50 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1338 (2001)
(“[P]ioneer brand-name drug companies are paying generic drug companies, which challenge the
brand-name drug patents, not to compete or to delay litigation.”).
8. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 698, 698–99 (2004) (explaining that these types of payments are known as “reverse,” “exit,”
or “exclusion” payments). See, e.g., Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to
Compete, FTC (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/competition/payfordelay.shtml
(commentators and the FTC refer to the payments as “pay-for-delay” agreements). This
Comment will use the term “reverse payment.”
9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C. (2006)). The
Act is known as the Hatch-Waxman Act due to its sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and
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Waxman’s goal was to increase generic drug competition in the
pharmaceutical drug market while still fostering patent innovation,
reverse payment settlements largely prevent generic drugs from timely
entering the marketplace. 10 As a result, drug prices remain inflated and
American health care consumers bear the burden. 11 According to the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), these anticompetitive agreements,
which rose to a record number in 2012, 12 cost consumers $3.5 billion
per year. 13
Due to the complex intersection of the regulatory scheme of HatchWaxman, antitrust principles, and patent law, circuit courts have
reached divergent conclusions on whether reverse payment settlements
are anticompetitive. 14 Three circuit courts have applied antitrust
scrutiny to find that reverse payments unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of federal antitrust law. 15 Conversely, three other circuit
courts have reasoned that a reverse payment is legal so long as it
remains within the “scope of the patent,” meaning within the
Representative Henry Waxman.
10. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647 (“The
purpose of Title I of the bill is to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after 1962.”); Brief of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk, 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 10-844) (noting that the goal of HatchWaxman was to “get generic drugs into the hands of patients at reasonable prices—fast”).
11. 2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
12. See FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003:
OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, A REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 1–
2 (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/130117mmareport.pdf (finding that reverse
payment settlements reported rose from twenty-eight in 2011 to forty in 2012). The reverse
payment settlements reported in 2012 “involve branded pharmaceutical products with combined
annual U.S. sales of approximately $8.3 billion.” Id.
13. 2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
14. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that reverse
payments are prima facie evidence of anticompetitive conduct); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reasoning that absent fraud
or sham, the court need not consider the patent validity and finding no antitrust violation); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning that the patent
conferred monopoly power and finding no antitrust violation); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that absent sham or fraud, a reverse payment does
not violate antitrust laws if it exists within the scope of the patent); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the court must consider the
exclusionary scope of the patent to determine whether an antitrust violation occurred); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (determining that the agreement
was a horizontal market allocation device, and thus per se illegal); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail
Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying antitrust scrutiny to find that the
agreement constituted prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade).
15. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218; In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 896; Andrx Pharms., Inc.,
256 F.3d at 799.
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exclusionary patent rights granted to the patent holder with regard to
both the product and the time period. 16
In fact, the Third Circuit and Eleventh Circuit reviewed the exact
same settlement agreement, in 2012 and 2005 respectively, but reached
opposite conclusions as to the agreement’s legality. 17 While the
Eleventh Circuit applied the scope of the patent test to find that the
payments were legal, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the scope of
the patent test and found that the payments constituted prima facie
evidence of an antitrust violation. 18 Beyond settling the differences in
opinion among the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court’s forthcoming
decision in Actavis will have significant implications for the
pharmaceutical industry and American consumers. 19
This Comment contains four Parts. Part I provides background
information regarding the reverse payment settlement problem,
including: Congress’s reasons for passing the Hatch-Waxman Act; the
Act’s basic mechanisms; basic principles of antitrust and patent law;
and the first two cases to deal with reverse payments after the Act’s
passage. Next, Part II discusses how the Second Circuit, Eleventh
Circuit, and Federal Circuit have applied the scope of the patent test to
reverse payment settlements, and how the Third Circuit has rejected the
test. Part III then analyzes these circuit court decisions, reasoning that
the Third Circuit has properly considered reverse payments as prima
facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade. Finally, Part IV
proposes that the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s
reasoning and consider additional factors regarding the reasonableness
of reverse payments.

16. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1323; In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at
187; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1056; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1294; In re K-Dur,
686 F.3d at 214–18.
17. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 212 (“Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC arose out of the same
settlement agreement as the instant appeal.”). See also Alison Frankel, 3rd Circuit Shocker: Payfor-Delay Drug Settlements are Illegal, THOMAS REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (July 16, 2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/07_-_July/3rd_Circuit_shocker__
Pay-for- delay_drug_settlements_are_illegal/(highlighting the circuit split controversy); Michelle
Olsen, Circuit Split Watch: A Division over Deals to Delay Generic Drugs, THE NAT’L L.J. (Aug.
1, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleSCI.jsp?id=1202565650711&slreturn=20120925
004723 (reporting the circuit split).
18. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1075.
19. See Greg Stohr, ‘Pay for Delay’ Drug Accords Get U.S. High Court Scrutiny,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-1207/pay-for-delay-drug-accords-get-u-dot-s-dot-high-court-scrutiny (reporting that Ralph Neas,
president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association, said, “This case could determine how an
entire industry does business because it would dramatically affect the economics of each decision
to introduce a generic drug”).

5_KUTCHER.DOCX

1098

4/18/2013 11:14 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

I. BACKGROUND
The landscape of the pharmaceutical industry prior to the HatchWaxman Act, and Congress’s intent in drafting the Act, provide an
important backdrop for cases involving reverse payments. First, this
Part explains the impetus behind the Hatch-Waxman Act and describes
the Act’s key provisions. Next, it will briefly explain antitrust and
patent law principles that courts apply in reverse payment cases. Lastly,
this Part discusses the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit’s holdings in
the In re Cardizem CD litigation to show how the law has developed
since reverse payments first reached the courts.
A. Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry prior to Hatch-Waxman
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), a
pharmaceutical company must receive approval of a new drug
application (“NDA”) from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
before it may market a prescription drug. 20 Among other requirements,
the company must provide full reports on the investigations that
demonstrate the drug product is safe and effective for its intended use.21
Prior to the passage of Hatch-Waxman, the FDA required generic drug
manufacturers to duplicate the expensive and time-consuming safety
and effectiveness studies already performed on the patented drugs.22
Because merely beginning the required tests amounted to patent
infringement, manufacturers could not start the lengthy FDA approval
process for a generic drug until the patent term for the brand-name
counterpart ended. 23 This delay created a lapse of several years
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
21. See Hearing Procedures for Refusal or Withdrawal of Approval of New Drug Applications
and for Issuance, Amendment, or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations, Interpretative
Description of Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 34 Fed. Reg. 14,596 (Sept.
19, 1969) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 130 and 146); Hearing Regulations and Regulations
Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed.
Reg. 7,250 (May 8, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 130 and 146).
22. From 1938 to 1962, drugs could obtain FDA approval with relative ease. Roche Prods.
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The law formerly required
innovator drug manufacturers to submit drug safety information for approval. Id. When
Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962, the law required that before marketing, drug
companies had to prove that all new drugs, generic and pioneer, would be safe and effective.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. Performing
expensive safety and efficacy testing led to an increase in drug prices. Stephanie Greene, A
Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry
of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 313–14 (2005). For a description of the Drug Amendments
of 1962, see Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 587–88 (2003).
23. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). See
Greene, supra note 22, at 313 (describing the generic manufacturers’ lobbying efforts).
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between expiration of the patent term and availability of a generic
version to consumers. 24 Indeed, the FDA rules created “the practical
extension of the monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the
expiration of the patent.” 25 At the time when Congress passed the
Hatch-Waxman Act, there was no generic equivalent for an estimated
150 drugs whose patent term had expired, and only thirty-five percent
of the best-selling drugs with expired patents had generic
counterparts. 26
In addition, the lengthy drug approval process deprived patent
holders of years of patent protection. 27 Prior to the 1962 amendments
to the FDA approval requirements, a drug’s effective patent life lasted
almost as long as its expected seventeen-year patent term. 28 The 1962
amendments, however, required pioneer brand owners to undertake
additional years of testing and clinical trials after the patent’s issuance
to ensure that the drug was effective for its intended use. 29 With these
additional tests, the total cost of developing a new drug skyrocketed into
The 1962 amendments
the hundreds of millions of dollars. 30
significantly eroded the term of exclusivity because the testing delayed
24. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
25. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688 (providing the
legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688; CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND
RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii (July 1998) [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
27. See Greene, supra note 22, at 313 (explaining why patent holders also lobbied for reforms
to the Drug Amendments of 1962); Colleen Kelly, The Balance between Innovation and
Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, The 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 417, 418 (2011) (discussing the reduced patent life resulting from onerous efficacy tests).
28. Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, FTC, Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent
Disputes at the Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at Northwestern University School of
Law (Nov. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Leary, Antitrust Issues], available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leary/learypharma.shtm.
29. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7,250 (May 8, 1970) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 130 and 146). See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 588 (stating that the
requirement that the drug be effective for its intended use means that the drug provides some
health benefit to the consumer). The FDA requires that most applicants perform at least two
“adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations” demonstrating statistically significant
benefits for consumers. Id.
30. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PHARMACEUTICAL R & D: COSTS, RISKS
AND REWARDS 214 (1993), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf (“Total
estimated preclinical pharmaceutical R&D constituted approximately $450 million in 1988.”);
Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003) (reporting costs at $802 million). Developing an average
NDA drug takes an average of fifteen years of research and costs more than $1.5 billion. PETER
BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 764 n.6 (3d ed. 2007).
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commercialization of the drug. 31 As a result, a drug’s average effective
patent life had fallen to less than seven years by 1981. 32
B. Hatch-Waxman’s Mechanisms to Promote Competition
and Innovation
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to address these
problems with the FDA drug approval process. 33 Congress intended the
Hatch-Waxman Act to provide incentives for research-based companies
to develop new drugs and to drive down drug prices by increasing
generic drug entry into the pharmaceutical market. 34
First, Congress sought to remedy the decline in a patent’s life by
offering patent term restoration and non-patent exclusivity. 35 The Act
restored the term of an eligible patent for a time equal to the time it took
the FDA to review and approve the product. 36 Congress also provided
additional market exclusivity periods independent of patent protection,
which ran concurrently with any remaining patent life, starting on the
date of marketing approval. 37
Second, in seeking to increase the number of generic drugs available
to consumers, Congress created the abbreviated new drug application
(“ANDA”), which allows generic manufacturers to rely on the
previously approved NDA information. 38 Instead of providing the FDA
with duplicative clinical data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of
the drug, the generic manufacturer may rely on the FDA’s prior findings
on safety and efficacy if it can show that the generic drug is
“bioequivalent” to the patented drug. 39 The generic drug manufacturer
31. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 588. See also Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton
Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 301
(1985) (noting the substantial decrease in patent term life).
32. James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition, and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 451–52 (1986).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2694; Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C. (2006)).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 268. See also Kelly,
supra note 27, at 421 (discussing the legislative history and intent of Hatch-Waxman).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); Kelly, supra note 27, at 425.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (c), (g)(6). The extension is half the time the drug is in clinical trials plus
the period spent waiting for FDA approval after the trials. For a detailed description of the patent
term extension provisions, see Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 591–93.
37. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 592 (detailing the non-patent exclusivity options).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
39. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). The FDA publishes patent information submitted in NDAs in the
“Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” commonly known as the
“Orange Book.” See FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
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must also prove that: (1) the active ingredient of the patented drug and
generic drug are the same; 40 (2) the generic drug has the same “route of
administration, dosage form and strength as the pioneer drug”; 41 and (3)
the pioneer drug and generic drug have the same labeling. 42 Generics
have an incentive to challenge the brand-name patents because the first
generic drug manufacturer to file its application can obtain 180 days of
market exclusivity, during which it is the only generic drug on the
market. 43
In the ANDA, the generic manufacturer must certify that its drug
does not infringe on the relevant patents of the pioneer drug
manufacturer or that the relevant patents are invalid. 44 This statement is
known as the paragraph IV certification. 45 Within twenty days of filing
its certification, the ANDA filer must notify the patent holder and
provide details to support its claim of non-infringement or invalidity. 46
When the patent holder receives notice of a certification relating to one
of its patents, it may challenge the generic manufacturer’s declaration
and sue to determine whether the relevant patents are infringed and
valid. 47 Though the generic has not entered the market before filing an
ANDA, the paragraph IV certification serves as an “artificial act of

EVALUATIONS (33d ed. 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/. To see procedures for
determining the bioequivalence of drug products, see 21 C.F.R. § 320.21–63 (2012). Overall, the
FDA considers the active ingredient in a generic product to be the same as the pioneer if it meets
the standards set forth in United States Pharmacopeia. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at
594 n.47. See FDA, BIOEQUIVALENCE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC PRODUCTS (Sept. 25,
2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm075207.htm (detailing bioequivalence guidelines).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii).
41. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
42. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i). The law includes certain exceptions to this element. See id.
43. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The first company to submit an ANDA including a paragraph IV
certification is commonly known as the “first filer” and later companies that submit an ANDA for
the same drug are called “subsequent filers.” Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 603 n.93.
See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing
the delay in approval of subsequent ANDAs where the prior ANDA contained a paragraph IV
certification). See also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 603 (noting the purpose of the
180-day market exclusivity period is to incentivize generics to challenge patent lawsuits).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). This is the certification that gives rise to controversial reverse
payment settlements under Hatch-Waxman.
45. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). An ANDA applicant must provide a certification with respect to
each patent listed in the Orange Book, which claims the reference drug or a method of using it.
The applicant must certify one of the following statements: (1) no patent information appears in
the Orange Book; (2) the patent has expired; (3) it will not seek approval until the patent expires;
or (4) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug. Id.
46. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)–(iv). The twenty-day notification rule was included in the 2003
amendments. See infra note 55 (explaining the 2003 amendments).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
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infringement,” allowing the pioneer drug owner to sue within forty-five
days. 48 If a pioneer drug owner files a patent infringement suit within
the allotted forty-five day time period, the FDA automatically stays
ANDA approval until the earliest of: (1) the date the patent expires; (2)
a court determines that the generic drug does not infringe on the patent
or the patent is invalid; or (3) the expiration of thirty months from
notice of the paragraph IV certification. 49 If the pioneer drug owner
does not sue during the forty-five day period, the FDA may approve the
ANDA on an accelerated time schedule. 50
The expense and uncertainty of patent litigation often moves
pharmaceutical companies to settle disputes with generic drug
manufacturers. 51 The generic drug manufacturer actually can receive
more money through settlement than through successful litigation, thus
aligning the parties’ interests. 52 That is to say, the Hatch-Waxman Act
inadvertently offers great incentives for generics to file first, but not
necessarily to aggressively pursue patent litigation. 53 In settling
disputes, many brand-name drug companies pay generic drug
companies to delay market entry until the patent life has ended or soon
before, which has raised significant antitrust disputes. 54 Though
48. Id. See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (finding that the
provision creates a “new (and somewhat artificial) act of infringement for a very limited and
technical purpose that relates only to certain drug applications”).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 203 (3d
Cir. 2012) (providing the statutory and regulatory framework for the case); FTC, GENERIC DRUG
ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at viii (July 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (summarizing key provisions of the Act).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
51. See ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER’S GUIDE TO PROFITING
FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 15 (2000) (reporting that a 1999 study by the Intellectual Property
Law Association found that the median total cost through the end of suit for patent litigation was
$2,225,000 in cases where the valued risk was between $10 and $100 million); Daniel A. Crane,
Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 757 (2002) (noting the direct and indirect costs of patent
litigation); Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve the
Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act while Resolving Antitrust Issues in Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 443 (2008) (explaining that “patent
litigation between a brand-name drug company and a generic drug company often settles so that
both parties can minimize risk of financial damages”).
52. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements] (reasoning that the parties’ aligned incentives to settle and delay generic drug market
entry makes the antitrust harm more severe).
53. Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes,
Part III, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 377, 381 (2007). See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7,
at 1586 (noting that the settlement removes the most vigorous challenger, an “important source of
early competition”).
54. See Leary, Antitrust Issues, supra note 28 (highlighting the problems with reverse
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Congress amended Hatch-Waxman in 2003 to stop brand-name firms
from exploiting the Act, pharmaceutical companies continue to arrange
reverse payment settlements to the detriment of American consumers. 55
In many ways, Hatch-Waxman’s attempt to promote innovation and
competition in the pharmaceutical industry was successful. 56 Since the
Act passed in 1984, the generic drug industry has grown to more than
$16 billion in annual sales, comprising more than fifty-three percent of
all prescriptions filled in 2004. 57 Before its passage, only thirty-five
percent of the best-selling drugs had generic equivalents; now nearly all
do. 58 Further, increased generic drug entry has effectively lowered drug
prices. 59 The Congressional Budget Office reports that such decreased

payment settlements); Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1553 (explaining the likely
antitrust risk of reverse payment settlements). An FTC study reported that fourteen out of twenty
final settlement agreements resolving patent litigation between pioneers and first generic ANDA
filers included provisions requiring the generic to wait for a specified amount of time before
entering the market. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION 26 (2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. Further, the study determined
that nine out of twenty settlements included payments from the pioneer to the generic, which
ranged from $1.75 million to $132.5 million. Id.
55. In 2003, Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act (“MMA”), Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2006 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), which, in part, amended the Hatch-Waxman
Act. Congress intended to stop firms from making agreements with “smaller rivals to delay or
limit competition.” 146 CONG. REC. S1538 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Waxman); S. REP. NO. 107-167, at 4 (2002). First, the 2003 revisions limited the stays to patents
submitted to the FDA before submission of the ANDA, which reduced the prevalence of
bottlenecking. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B). Under Hatch-Waxman, a pioneer firm could list an
additional patent in the Orange Book after the generic filed an ANDA. Id. Then, if the generic
filed a paragraph IV certification, the pioneer could sue and receive another thirty-month stay. Id.
§ 355(q)(G). The second amendment to Hatch-Waxman created forfeiture events that resulted in
generics forfeiting their 180-day exclusivity period. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D). Now, the first filer loses
exclusivity if it fails to market the drug by the later of: (1) seventy-five days after FDA approval,
or (2) seventy-five days after an appellate court decision finding invalidity or non-infringement.
Id. Then, the exclusivity period would last to the subsequent court decision, which could occur
long after the FDA’s approval. Id. Finally, the Act required brand-name and generic companies
to file settlement agreements concerning the 180-day exclusivity period or the production, sale, or
marketing of a drug with the FTC and Department of Justice within ten days of the agreement.
Id.
56. See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 175 (2008)
(noting that Hatch-Waxman “effectively created the modern generic pharmaceutical industry”).
See also Kelly, supra note 27, at 426–27 (highlighting the successes of the Act).
57. Mary W. Bourke & M. Edward Danberg, Current Trends in Hatch-Waxman Patent
Litigation: A System Still in Flux, in PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 2006: ACROSS THE PRODUCT LIFE
CYCLE 939 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2006).
58. CBO REPORT, supra note 26, at xii.
59. FDA, GENERIC COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES (Apr. 4, 2006). The generic entry only
drives down the cost of the innovator drug price by five percent. Id. The entry of the second
generic competitor drives down the innovator drug price by fifty percent, and the sixth by
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drug prices save consumers eight to ten billion dollars a year.60
Simultaneously, incentives for innovation have contributed to
significant progress in U.S. pharmaceutical development, and the
United States continues to dominate the world’s pharmaceutical drug
market. 61
Notwithstanding the Hatch-Waxman Act’s successes, high drug
prices remain a significant concern for consumers and policymakers.62
Reverse payment settlements are a contributing factor to such high
prices, thwarting a fully effective implementation of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 63
C. Relevant Principles of Antitrust and Patent Law
Antitrust and patent law issues dominate a court’s analysis of reverse
payments. The legality of reverse payments rests on whether they are
anticompetitive even though the brand-name drug company owns a
patent. 64 In general, antitrust law preserves the fundamental rules of
competition to protect and encourage lower prices, spark innovation,
and maintain efficient industry production. 65 Specifically, section 1 of
the Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade. 66 Courts
seventy-five percent. Id.
60. CBO REPORT, supra note 26, at xiii.
61. See GENIA LONG & JUSTIN WORKS, ANALYSIS GRP., INNOVATION IN THE
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PIPELINE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEW 1 (2013), available at http://
www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/2012_Innovation_in_the_Biopharma
ceutical_Pipeline.pdf (reporting that the United States “leads the world in the development of new
medicines”). The average marketing period increased from nine years before Hatch-Waxman to
eleven-and-a-half years in the following decade. CBO REPORT, supra note 26, at 39. Ten of the
“blockbuster” drugs in 1997 received extensions for at least two years. Alfred B. Engelberg,
Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA
389, 426 (1999).
62. See, e.g., Peter B. Bach, Leonard B. Saltz & Robert E. Wittes, Op-Ed., In Cancer Care,
Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at A25 (noting criticism from doctors at Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center of unsustainably high drug prices); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010–2020, at 2 (Jan. 2011)
(finding that prescription drug spending is expected to grow at an average of 7.2% from 2015
through 2020, “reflecting slower increases in generic drugs’ share of the market and the costs of
new drugs becoming available during these years”).
63. See supra note 6 (explaining the effect of reverse payments on drug prices).
64. See generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing the
intersection of antitrust and patent law to resolve the reverse payment problem).
65. MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1 (2006).
66. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Sherman Act provides, “Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” Id. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.” (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
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traditionally determine whether a restraint is reasonable by applying the
“rule of reason.” 67 Under the rule of reason analysis, the factfinder
must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable
restraint on competition. 68 The factfinder may consider specific
characteristics of the relevant business, the impact of the restraint on the
condition of the business, and the history, nature, and effect of the
restraint to determine the reasonableness of a challenged business
practice. 69 Courts generally perform this inquiry in three steps. 70 First,
the plaintiff must show that the conduct produced anticompetitive
effects in the market. 71 Next, if the plaintiff meets this initial burden,
“the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the challenged conduct
promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.” 72 Finally, the
plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s evidence by demonstrating that the
restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated
procompetitive objective. 73
Although courts typically apply the rule of reason analysis, courts
also have recognized that certain types of restraints are per se illegal
because they result in “predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
effect[s]” on competition 74 and “lack any redeeming virtue.” 75 A
restraint is per se illegal when it “facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition or decrease
output.” 76 When the per se approach applies, the court does not
(1997))); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence.”).
67. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 & n.13 (1982)).
70. Id.
71. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). The plaintiff may satisfy
this burden by offering proof of the existence of actual anticompetitive effects. Id. See, e.g., FTC
v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (reduction of output); Tunis Bros. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991) (increase in price and deterioration in quality
of goods or services). If the plaintiff is unable to offer this proof, the plaintiff may offer proof of
defendant’s market power. Tunis Bros. Co., 952 F.2d at 727; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
72. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. Social welfare concerns are insufficient objectives. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The fact that engineers
are often involved in large-scale projects significantly affecting the public safety does not alter
our analysis.”).
73. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669.
74. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
75. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
76. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (identifying horizontal price fixing as
preventing competition); N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (identifying output limitations, market
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consider the intent behind the restraint, any claimed procompetitive
justifications, or the restraint’s actual effect on competition. 77 Classic
examples of behavior subject to the per se rule include price fixing,
group boycotts, and horizontal restraints of trade restricting prices or
territories. 78
In addition, courts apply an intermediate standard, known as the
“quick look” rule of reason analysis, when per se condemnation and
rule of reason analyses are inappropriate. 79 Under the quick look rule,
once the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s practices are similar to
those subject to per se treatment, the plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive market effects. Instead, the defendant
must provide a procompetitive justification for a restraint on trade. 80
Antitrust laws seek not only to protect consumers from artificially
high prices, maximize market efficiency, and prevent predatory
behavior by dominant companies, but also to promote innovation.81
Because reverse payments are horizontal agreements, 82 they appear to
be clear antitrust violations. 83 However, the presence of patent rights,

allocation, and group boycotts as evidence of competition restrictions).
77. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100. The courts rationalize that while there is a risk that applying per
se illegality will invalidate a restraint that the rule of reason would otherwise permit, it is a
necessary cost of this more efficient approach. See Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S.
332, 344 (1982) (“As in every rule of general application, the match between the presumed and
the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have
tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved to be
reasonable.”).
78. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907 (6th Cir. 2003). See, e.g., Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 (“Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned
as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach because the probability that these practices
are anticompetitive is so high.”).
79. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669. It applies where “no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character” of an inherently suspect restraint. Id.
80. See id. (“Because competitive harm is presumed, the defendant must promulgate ‘some
competitive justification’ for the restraint, ‘even if the absence of detailed market analysis’
indicating actual profit maximization or increased costs to the consumer resulting from the
restraint.” (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110)).
81. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (1986).
See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1598–99 (arguing that innovation is an internal
norm of antitrust law).
82. Horizontal agreements are agreements to cooperate between competitors at the same level
in the market. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (“Restraints
imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizontal
restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firm at different levels of distribution as
vertical restraints.”).
83. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“[A]n agreement between a monopolist and a potential competitor to divide between them and
exclude other competition is per se illegal under Section 1 [of the Sherman Act].”), aff’d, 429
F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2006). Several commentators argue that reverse payments are per se illegal.
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which confer a monopoly power on the patent owner, has confounded
the courts on the issue of reverse payments. 84
As antitrust law fosters innovation through competition, the
intellectual property system promotes innovation through “governmentsanctioned monopolies.” 85 The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power to enact patent legislation to advance scientific progress. 86 The
Patent Act gives a patent holder the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the product throughout the United States.87
After receiving a patent from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), the patent is presumed valid for procedural purposes at trial. 88
This right-to-exclude gives the patentee a monopoly that would
otherwise violate antitrust laws. 89 The patentee “can grant exclusive
territorial licenses carving up the United States among its licensees.” 90
However, that right exists only within the “limits of the patent
monopoly.” 91 That is, a valid patent does not give the patent holder any
exemption from the Sherman Act’s provisions, which “imposes strict
limitations on the concerted activities in which patent owners may
lawfully engage.” 92

See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent
Settlements, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2003) [hereinafter O’Rourke & Brodley, An
Incentives Approach]; Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements:
Presumptions, Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141, 141 (2009); Joshua P. Davis, Applying
Litigation Economics to Patent Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should be Per Se Illegal, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 255, 255 (2009).
84. See cases cited supra note 14 (examining courts applying different analysis and finding
different conclusions on similar facts).
85. Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is the
Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 441 (2006).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 282. The Federal Circuit has interpreted section 282 of the Patent Act of 1952
as requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of patent validity. z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Connell v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The “burden of establishing invalidity of
a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282.
A principal drafter of the 1952 Act, Judge Rich, explained that the drafters derived the premise
from the basic proposition that the PTO “is presumed to do its job.” Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing a holding that claims were
invalid for obviousness). Judge Rich reasoned that the court owes deference to the PTO, unless a
party presents new evidence on validity. Id. at 1360.
89. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2003).
90. Id. at 1305.
91. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97 (1963) (quoting United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)).
92. Id. at 197 (citation omitted).
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D. The Cardizem CD Cases
Although the first two circuit courts to consider reverse payments
applied strict antitrust scrutiny to the agreements, 93 the next three circuit
courts to consider the issue leniently applied the scope of the patent test,
finding that such agreements are permissible if they do not exceed the
potential exclusionary scope of the patent. 94 This Section explains the
first two of these cases to set the backdrop for a discussion of the circuit
split in Part II. 95
In Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, Andrx
Pharmaceuticals (“Andrx”) filed an ANDA on September 22, 1995,
seeking FDA approval of a generic form of Hoechst Marion Russell,
Inc.’s (“HMRI”) Cardizem CD, a heart drug. 96 In early 1996, HMRI
sued for patent infringement, 97 triggering the thirty-month waiting
period during which the FDA cannot provide final approval to any
ANDA applications. 98 Soon after, in June 1997, Biovail, another
generic manufacturer, filed an ANDA for the same drug. 99 The FDA
issued a tentative approval of Andrx’s ANDA on September 15,
1997. 100 Only nine days later, HMRI and Andrx entered into an
93. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (determining that
the agreement was a horizontal market allocation device, and thus illegal per se); Andrx Pharms.,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying antitrust scrutiny to find
that the agreement constituted prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade).
94. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(reasoning that absent fraud or sham, it need not consider the patent validity, the court found no
antitrust violation); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 220 (2d Cir. 2006)
(reasoning that the patent confers a monopoly power, and the court found no antitrust violation);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that absent sham
or fraud, a reverse payment does not violate antitrust laws if it exists within the scope of the
patent); Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 (reasoning that the court must consider the
exclusionary scope of the patent to determine whether an antitrust violation occurred).
95. See infra Part II.
96. 256 F.3d at 803. Cardizem CD carries U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584. DefendantsAppellants’ Brief at 8, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2001) (No. 002483).
97. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 803.
98. Id.
99. Id. Here, Biovail is a “subsequent filer” to Andrx. See supra note 43 (noting the
nomenclature of “first filer” and “subsequent filer”).
100. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 803. Tentative approval means that the FDA sent a
letter to the ANDA applicant “stating that all scientific and procedural conditions for approval of
generic drug have been met, but final approval has been delayed, usually because the FDA has
concluded that the statutory marketing exclusivity period of a prior generic drug has not yet
expired.” Brief of Appellant Biovail Corporation at ix, Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.
Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Nos. 00-5050, 00-5396). Interestingly, when Biovail filed
its ANDA, HMRI offered a Biovail a lucrative arrangement “under which Biovail would be
compensated for postponing the marketing of its generic version of Cardizem CD and for
refraining from assisting Andrx in marketing that first-filer’s competing generic version,” but
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agreement, providing that HMRI would pay Andrx $40 million per
year, starting when Andrx received final approval from the FDA. 101
HMRI would stop paying Andrx if the court found Andrx liable for
patent infringement, and if not, when Andrx began selling the generic
version of Cardizem CD. 102 Though the parties maintained that the
agreement did not settle the litigation, 103 it created a bottleneck by
delaying commencement of Andrx’s 180-day marketing exclusivity
period, thereby delaying entry of any generic on the market—namely,
Biovail’s attempt at producing the generic drug. 104
As evidence of the intent and effect of the settlement agreement,
Andrx did not begin marketing and selling the generic version of
Cardizem CD until a year after it was eligible to do so. 105 On July 9,
1998, the FDA issued its final approval of Andrx’s ANDA. 106 Pursuant
to the agreement, HMRI began making quarterly payments to Andrx,
and in exchange, Andrx did not bring its generic drug to market. 107
Because Andrx was the first generic applicant for Cardizem CD and the
company effectively delayed the 180-day marketing exclusivity period,
the FDA could not approve any subsequently filed ANDAs and no
generic versions of the drug could enter the market. 108
Subsequently, Biovail filed an action in the D.C. Circuit, claiming
that Andrx and HMRI violated the Sherman Act by creating a
bottleneck in the market. 109 The D.C. Circuit held for Biovail,
Biovail rejected the offer. Id. at 7.
101. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 803.
102. Id.
103. Id. Andrx and HMRI argued that the agreement “purported to maintain the status quo
pending the outcome of HMRI’s patent infringement suit against Andrx.” Id.
104. Id. at 804.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 22, at 600–01 (offering a detailed
explanation of the exclusivity provisions). On September 11, 1998, Andrx filed a supplement to
its original ANDA seeking approval for a reformulated generic version of Cardizem CD. In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003). In doing so, Andrx notified
HMRI and certified that the reformulated product did not infringe on HMRI’s patent. Id. Finally,
on June 9, 1999, the FDA approved Andrx’s reformulated generic product and after one year of
payments, HMRI and Andrx terminated the agreement and settled the litigation. Id. HMRI paid
Andrx a final sum of $50.7 million, bringing the total payments to $89.83 million. Id. Shortly
thereafter, Andrx began marketing the generic version of Cardizem, Cartia XT, which captured a
substantial share of the market. Id.
109. In 1998, Andrx sued the FDA and other ANDA applicants, including Biovail, to quiet its
right as the first-time applicant, which entitles the applicant to 180-day market exclusivity. Andrx
Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 804. Andrx sought injunctive relief, requiring the FDA to provide
Andrx with the 180-day market exclusivity and prohibiting the FDA from approving any other
ANDAs, such as Biovail’s, until the 180-day period terminated. Id. Biovail counterclaimed,
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reasoning that a payment from a drug-innovator to the challenging
generic drug firm strongly suggested “the anticompetitive intent of the
parties in entering the agreement and the rent-preserving effect of that
agreement.” 110 Andrx argued that it simply acted within its rights under
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 111 The court found that although HatchWaxman allowed for these settlements, the Act did not insulate
defendants from antitrust liability. 112 Further, the court noted that
because a reasonable juror could consider payment from HMRI to
Andrx as a quid pro quo for Andrx’s delay of market entry, the
agreement served as prima facie evidence of an illegal agreement not to
compete. 113
The Sixth Circuit considered the same agreement in In re Cardizem
CD. In this case, the plaintiffs were direct and indirect consumers of
Cardizem CD, whereas in the first litigation, Biovail brought the
lawsuit. 114 Like the D.C. Circuit in Andrx, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s holding that the agreement was a per se illegal
restraint of trade because it sought to delay Andrx’s market entry, as
well as other products not covered by the patent. 115 The Sixth Circuit

alleging that Andrx violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Brief of Appellant Biovail
Corporation at 2, Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Nos.
00-5050, 00-5396).
The District Court granted Andrx’s motion to dismiss Biovail’s
counterclaim, finding that as a private plaintiff that had not yet entered the market, it could not
plead an antitrust injury. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185–87 (D.D.C.
2000). Biovail was required to establish standing as a private plaintiff under the section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). According to the Clayton Act, a competitor that has not
entered the market suffers injury from antitrust violation if it can demonstrate its intention to
enter the market and its preparedness to do so. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 807 (citing
Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The D.C. Circuit
held that even if it was appropriate for the lower court to dismiss for lack of standing, the district
court should not have dismissed with prejudice because the Biovail could still allege intent and
preparedness to enter the market. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 807.
110. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 809. “Typically, in patent infringement cases the
payment flows from the alleged infringer to the patent holder. A payment flowing from the
innovator to the challenging generic firm . . . may indicate whether the generic firm has the
incentive or ability to enter the market or to pursue fully the litigation.” David A. Balto,
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 335 (2000).
111. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 811.
112. Id. See also Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1577–78 (discussing a
common argument of brand-name pharmaceutical companies that the payments are a “natural
byproduct” of regulation).
113. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 256 F.3d at 813.
114. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003).
115. Id. at 908–09. The district court had concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged
antitrust injury by applying the test the Supreme Court set forth in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.: antitrust injury is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.” 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977). Further, the district court noted that the Supreme Court had stated that the Sherman Act’s
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reasoned that the agreement was a plain and obvious “horizontal
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD
throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal
restraint of trade.” 116 Further, the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendants’
arguments that the agreement solely sought to enforce patent rights,
reasoning that there was a difference between exercising patent holder
rights and “bolstering” the patent’s monopoly power with an illegal
arrangement. 117 The court also rejected defendants’ argument that this
“novel” area of law entitled it to avoid per se treatment. 118 Instead, the
Sixth Circuit found that the Sherman Act “establishes one uniform rule
applicable to all industries alike.” 119 Thus, because the court applied
the per se rule, it did not need to consider the defendants’ claims that the
agreement had procompetitive benefits. 120
II. DISCUSSION
While the D.C. and Sixth Circuits applied antitrust scrutiny to reverse
payments in the Cardizem CD cases, 121 more recent cases in the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have instead applied the scope
of the patent test to similar cases, favoring judicial efficiency over
promotion of a competitive and fair prescription drug market. 122 This

purpose was to ensure competitive prices for consumers and protect the “economic freedom of
participants in the relevant market.” In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908 (citing Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983)). See
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, and
the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”).
116. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908.
117. Id.
118. Id. The defendants argued that the district court’s errors concerning Hatch-Waxman
showed that there had been insufficient judicial experience to condemn the agreement as per se
illegal. Defendants-Appellants’ Brief at 44–45, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896
(6th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-2483).
119. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457
U.S. 332, 349 (1982)).
120. Id. at 909.
121. See id. at 914–15; Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809–10
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying antitrust scrutiny to find that the agreement constituted prima facie
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade).
122. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(reasoning that absent fraud or sham, it need not consider the patent validity, leading the court to
find no antitrust violation); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir.
2006) (reasoning that the patent confers a monopoly power and finding no antitrust violation);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075–76 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that absent
sham or fraud, a reverse payment does not violate antitrust laws if it exists within the scope of the
patent); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2003)
(reasoning that the court must consider the exclusionary scope of the patent to determine whether
an antitrust violation occurred, leading the court to find the payment was legal).
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Part discusses the cases that form the current state of the law,
illustrating a clear circuit split over whether reverse payment
settlements are anticompetitive.
A. Valley Drug Co.: Creating the Scope of the Patent Test
The Eleventh Circuit was the first circuit to depart from the antitrust
analysis applied in Andrx and In re Cardizem CD. 123 The first reverse
payment case the Eleventh Circuit considered, Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., revolved around two settlement
agreements Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) made with two
manufacturers that aimed to produce a generic version of Abbott’s
highly profitable drug, Hytrin. 124 Abbott sued the generic drug
manufacturers, Zenith Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Zenith”) and Geneva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Geneva”), for patent infringement when the
manufacturers claimed that Abbott’s patent for Hytrin was invalid in
their respective ANDAs. 125
Abbott and Zenith entered into an agreement (“Zenith Agreement”)
in which Zenith admitted the validity of Abbott’s patents and agreed not
to sell or distribute any pharmaceutical product containing any form of
Hytrin’s main compound, terazosin hydrochloride, until another generic
introduced that compound or Abbott’s Patent No. 4,215,532 expired.126
In exchange, Abbott agreed to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3
million after three months, and $6 million every three months until a
certain date or until the Zenith Agreement terminated. 127
Similarly, Abbott entered into an agreement with Geneva (“Geneva
Agreement”), in which Geneva agreed to the same terms as Zenith, not
123. Later courts would follow the Eleventh Circuit’s lead in applying the scope of the patent
test. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1340; In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466
F.3d at 220; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1075.
124. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299–300. In 1987, Abbott began marketing Hytrin, a drug
used in the treatment of hypertension and benign prostatic hyperplasia. Id. at 1298. Abbott
generated $540 million in sales in 1998 alone, which constituted more than twenty percent of
Abbott’s net sales of United States pharmaceutical products that year. Defendants-Appellants’
Opening Brief at 5, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-12091-J). Abbott’s Hytrin patent covered the basic terazosin hydrochloride compound.
Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Brief at 9, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-12091-J) [hereinafter Sherman Act Brief].
125. Sherman Act Brief, supra note 124, at 9. First, Geneva filed four ANDAs based on
Hytrin’s main chemical compound between 1993 and 1996, and made paragraph IV certifications
regarding Abbott’s listed patents each time. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299. Abbott sued
Geneva for patent infringement and Geneva claimed the patent was invalid. Id. Meanwhile,
Zenith filed an ANDA for a generic based on Hytrin and patent infringement litigation ensued.
Id.
126. Id. at 1300.
127. Id.
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to transfer or sell its right to the 180-day marketing exclusivity period,
and not to oppose any subsequent ANDAs. 128 In return, Abbott would
pay Geneva $4.5 million each month until either another generic
manufacturer brought a generic terazosin hydrochloride product to
market or Abbott won a favorable decision in the district court patent
infringement case. 129
A class of generic drug manufacturers, pharmacies, and interest
groups sued Abbott and Geneva, claiming that the Geneva Agreement
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 130 Reversing the district court,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the agreements were not per se
illegal. 131 The court reasoned that the district court failed to accurately
weigh the exclusionary power of the patent. 132 Because a patent-owner
has the lawful right to exclude others, the court found that the patentee
could exploit the exclusionary right to gain market share. 133 Further,

128. Id.
129. Id. Pursuant to the Geneva Agreement, if Geneva won in district court, Abbott’s
payments would go into escrow pending resolution of appeal. Id. On September 1, 1998, the
district court granted Geneva’s motion for summary judgment in the patent infringement suit,
holding the ’207 patent was invalid due to the on-sale bar. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc.,
Nos. 96-C-3331, 96-C-5868, & 97-C-7587, 1998 WL 566884, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1998). See
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (providing that a patent is invalid or cannot be granted if a form of the
compound was on sale in the United States or another country for more than one year prior to the
application date for the patent). Abbott and Geneva terminated the settlement agreement earlier
than intended because the FTC initiated an investigation. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1301.
Abbott and Geneva entered into consent decrees with the FTC, prohibiting Abbott and Geneva
from entering into brand-generic agreements similar to the one they terminated. In re Abbott
Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL 681848, at *7 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000). The orders prohibited Abbott
and Geneva from entering into brand-generic agreements that would raise antitrust risks. See
Uche Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical
Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 261 (2005) (detailing the specifics
of the FTC orders). Pursuant to the Geneva Agreement, Abbott paid Geneva a total of $27
million. Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Brief at 9–12, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-12091-J).
130. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1295–96.
131. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1354 (S.D. Fla.
2000), rev’d sub nom. 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). The district court found that the
settlement agreement was a horizontal market allocation between competitors. Valley Drug Co.,
344 F.3d at 1304.
132. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304–07. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 164 F. Supp.
2d at 1345–46 (discounting the exclusionary patent right in its antitrust analysis).
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining patent infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (offering
injunctive relief for infringement); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150–51 (1989) (reasoning that allowing patentees to exploit market share is a key incentive for
innovation); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (“[T]he essence
of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.”); Gen.
Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 189 (permitting a license restricting the
licensee’s sales to non-commercial customers); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1981) (finding that a patentee can choose to exclude everyone from
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the court noted that because patents offer patentees the unique
opportunity to “grant exclusive territorial licenses,” the patent was an
exception to the traditional antitrust rule that market allocation is an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 134 Applying this concept to the
settlement agreement, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the effect of
the Geneva Agreement or the Zenith Agreement would not extend
beyond the exclusionary right of the patent itself. 135
In considering the intersection of patent and antitrust law, the court
concluded that scrutinizing settlements for antitrust liability would
undermine patent incentives, which it favored over promoting
competition. 136 In addition, the court noted that patent litigation was
too expensive, created too much uncertainty, and took too much time to
justify limiting settlements by subjecting them to antitrust scrutiny. 137
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in
In re Cardizem CD, reasoning that where the issue involved the
exclusionary power of a patent, the antitrust analysis could not ignore
the scope of the patent. 138 Instead, the court held that the patent was an
exception to antitrust liability, which required courts to consider the
scope of the patent, whether the agreement exceeded the scope, and the
anticompetitive effects of the excess. 139 The Eleventh Circuit further

producing the patented articles). But see United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 380
(1952) (holding that patentees cannot pool patents and fix prices).
134. The court reasoned that “a patentee’s allocation of territories is not always the kind of
territorial market allocation that triggers antitrust liability” because “the patent gives its owner a
lawful exclusionary right.” Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1305. For a discussion of patent
exceptionalism theory, see Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1597–604.
135. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1305.
136. Id. at 1307–08. The court was responding to the class claim that a patent exception to
antitrust liability did not apply in this case because Abbott’s ’207 patent was eventually deemed
invalid. Id. at 1306–07. The court sought to strike a balance between antitrust law’s free
competition requirement and patent law’s incentive system, noting that they both “seek the same
object: the welfare of the public.” Id. at 1307–08 (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 1780a (1999)). See also Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The patent and antitrust laws are complementary in purpose in that they
promote innovation and competition . . . .”).
137. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 (“Patent litigation is too complex and the results too
uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether enforcing the exclusionary right through
settlement will expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were destroyed by the mere
invalidity of the patent.”). The court noted that the cost savings of settlement benefit the parties
and the public. Id. at 1308 n.20 (citing Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th
Cir. 1976)).
138. See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1310 (“‘[T]he protection of the patent laws and the
coverage of antitrust laws are not separate issues.’” (quoting United States v. Studiengesellschaft
Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (alteration in original)).
139. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1311–12. Commentators would later term this inquiry the
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held that instead of per se branding, the district court could apply rule of
reason antitrust analysis to the provisions of the settlement agreement
that could impact the market beyond the effect of Abbott’s patents. 140
Departing from the Sixth Circuit’s characterization of reverse
payments as per se antitrust violations, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized
the importance of the exclusionary right of the patent and created a new
test for reverse payment settlements. 141 Although the Eleventh Circuit
instructed the lower court to apply the rule of reason analysis to the
provisions outside the scope of the patent, later courts would extend this
inquiry essentially to foreclose any antitrust scrutiny of reverse payment
settlements. 142
B. Schering-Plough v. FTC: Expanding the Scope of the Patent Test
Three years later, the Eleventh Circuit heard a case that stemmed
from the same settlement agreement that the Third Circuit would later
find anticompetitive in In re K-Dur. 143 In Schering-Plough v. FTC,
Upsher-Smith Laboratories (“Upsher”) sought FDA approval to market
the generic version of one of Schering-Plough Corporation’s
(“Schering”) patented drugs, K-Dur 20, and Schering promptly sued
“scope of the patent test.” See, e.g., Michael C. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test
Cannot Solve the Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012)
[hereinafter Carrier, “Scope of the Patent” Test]; Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity
in Antitrust Cases Challenging Hatch-Waxman Act Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 60 n.87
(2010). The appellate court instructed the district court to identify the protections afforded by the
patents and consider whether the agreements reflected these policy objectives. Valley Drug Co.,
344 F.3d at 1312. The Eleventh Circuit further instructed the district court to compare certain
provisions of the agreements to the protections offered by a preliminary injunction, as well as to
consider the provision in light of the likelihood that Abbott would obtain those protections. Id.
140. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. On remand, the district court found that at the time
the parties entered into the settlement agreement, Abbott would not have been able to receive a
preliminary injunction, and the litigation would have found the ’207 patent invalid. In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
Following the appellate court’s instructions, the district court established that the provision of the
settlement agreement indeed exceeded the exclusionary scope of the ’207 patent, and then applied
“normal” antitrust principles to find that the provision was anticompetitive. Id. at 1310.
141. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1310 (“We recognize that the Sixth Circuit appeared to take
the opposite view . . . .”). See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that the agreement was a horizontal market allocation device, and was therefore
per se illegal).
142. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312. The Eleventh Circuit instructed the district court to
apply traditional antitrust analysis to provisions outside the exclusionary effects of Abbott’s
patent to “assess their probable anticompetitive effects.” Id. However, since Schering-Plough
extended this inquiry to the scope of the patent test, no court applying the test has reached an
antitrust analysis or found an antitrust violation. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 212
(3d Cir. 2012).
143. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005). See In re KDur, 686 F.3d at 211.
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Upsher for patent infringement. 144 The parties immediately settled the
case, agreeing that Upsher would not enter the market until a certain
date and that Schering would license other Upsher products in return,
including a product called Niacor. 145 Schering had previously explored
investing in a Niacor license and then declined due to disappointing
sales of a very similar drug owned by Kos Pharmaceuticals, Niaspan. 146
On the eve of the trial, Schering and Upsher finalized the agreement,
providing that Schering would pay: (1) $60 million in initial royalty
fees; (2) $10 million in milestone royalty payments; and (3) ten or
fifteen percent royalties on sales. 147
The FTC filed an administrative complaint alleging that the
settlement agreement violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 148 The
144. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1059. Schering-Plough manufactured an “extendedrelease microencapsulated potassium chloride product, K-Dur 20,” which treated high blood
pressure and congestive heart disease. Id. at 1058. Though the active ingredient in K-Dur 20,
potassium chloride, is commonly used and unpatentable, Schering-Plough owned a formulation
patent on the extended-release coating, which surrounds the potassium chloride in K-Dur 20.
U.S. Patent No. 4,863,743 (filed Feb. 19, 1986). The patent expired on September 5, 2006. Id.
145. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1059. Before reaching a final agreement, Schering
refused to pay Upsher to stay out of the market and proposed that the two companies agree on the
date Upsher would introduce the generic version to market. Id. In exchange for setting this date,
Schering agreed to purchase an exclusive license to market Niacor, a sustained-release niacin
product used to reduce cholesterol, which Schering had been interested in pursuing. Id. In June
1997, Schering received five licenses to market five Upsher products, one of which was Niacor.
Id. Along with the license, Schering received the results of Niacor’s clinical studies. Id. James
Audibert, the head of Schering’s Global Marketing Division for cardiovascular products,
evaluated the profitability and effectiveness of Niacor and found that Niacor’s net value at the
time was between $245 and $265 million. Id. at 1059–60. Audibert’s assessment was
independent from the settlement agreement and he was unaware of the amount of money Upsher
requested for the license rights. Answering Brief of Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. at 9, ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).
146. After determining that the deal was profitable for Schering, the board approved the
licensing transaction. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1060. The profitability forecast
corresponded to an independent profitability assessment that Schering performed regarding Kos
Pharmaceutical’s Niaspan, a product similar to Niacor. Id. Schering estimated that Niaspan sales
would reach $174 million by 2005 for the U.S. market and predicted Niacor would reach $136
million for a global market segment larger than the U.S. market alone. Id. Unfortunately,
Niaspan reported disappointing first-quarter sales, causing Kos Pharmaceutical’s stock price to
drop dramatically from $30.94 to $6.00. Id. As a result, Upsher and Schering refrained from
investing further in Niacor. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273).
147. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1060; Brief of Petitioner Upsher-Smith Laboratories,
Inc. at 4, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA).
148. The FTC also alleged that the agreement violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). In addition, the FTC filed an administrative complaint
against ESI Lederle (“ESI”), which also sought to market its generic version of K-Dur 20.
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1060. Patent litigation ensued, but unlike Schering and
Upsher, Schering and ESI participated in court-mandated mediation, which “resulted in nothing
more than an impasse.” Id. Ultimately, ESI and Schering agreed that ESI could enter the market
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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the settlements were
lawful and the FTC appealed this decision to the full Commission.149
The Commission reversed the ALJ’s decision, concluding that the
settlements violated the Sherman Act. 150 The Commission observed
that even though Niacor had potentially serious safety and market
concerns, Schering failed to include key employees in the negotiations,
to request sales projections, to pursue unfulfilled requests, and to object
when Upsher suspended its investigative work—all of which
demonstrated Schering’s lack of genuine interest in Niacor and revealed
that the purpose of Schering’s payment was only to delay the generic
drug from entering the market. 151 Therefore, the Commission found
that Schering’s payment to Upsher was illegitimate consideration for the
licenses and that the settlement agreement violated the Sherman Act. 152
Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the FTC’s determination,
holding that the settlement agreement was not anticompetitive in line
with Valley Drug. 153 Reasoning that patents naturally confer a
monopoly power that limits competition, the court found that neither the
rule of reason nor the per se analysis was appropriate in analyzing
reverse payment settlements. 154
Instead, applying the scope of the patent test from Valley Drug, the
court found that Schering’s patent entitled it to exclude Upsher from the
market until a court determined the patent was invalid or Upsher proved
its product did not infringe on the patent. 155 Further, the court found
three years before the patent would expire and if the FDA approved ESI’s ANDA by a certain
date, Schering would pay ESI $10 million. Id. at 1060–61. On October 21, 2001, the FTC
withdrew the complaint against American Home Products (“AHP”), the parent company of ESI,
to consider a proposed consent agreement. Id. at 1061. On April 2, 2002, the FTC approved a
final consent order. Id. at 1061 n.9. Though AHP was not a party in this litigation, Schering’s
settlement with ESI/AHP “remained at issue with respect to Schering.” Id.
149. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1061.
150. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 985 (2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th
Cir. 2005).
151. Id. at 1019, 1037, 1043, 1051–52. To see a comparison of Schering’s sales projections
for Niacor and Niaspan, see Opening Brief of Schering-Plough Corporation at 18, ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA).
152. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1061–62. Additionally, the Commission ruled that it
would invalidate any agreement by which the generic receives value for deferring its own
research, development, or production, unless the value of the payment was a reasonable estimate
of litigation costs and the parties notified the FTC of the agreement. Id.
153. Id. at 1063–76.
154. Id. at 1065. The court elaborated, “‘What is required here is an analysis of the extent to
which antitrust liability might undermine the encouragement of innovation and disclosure, or the
extent to which the patent laws prevent antitrust liability for such exclusionary effects.’” Id. at
1066 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 n.27 (11th Cir.
2003)).
155. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066, 1072 (examining the scope of the exclusionary
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that the agreement did not provide exclusionary rights exceeding the
scope of the patent. 156 The negotiations leading up to the settlement,
the fact that licensed products often do not ultimately enter the market
in the pharmaceutical industry, and that the parties intended “royalty” to
mean that Schering would pay Upsher for licenses and production rights
led the court to find that Schering paid Upsher a fair price for licenses,
which did not restrict competition. 157 Further, the court noted that the
general policy in the law to favor settlements applied to patent litigation
lawsuits. 158 The court concluded that Schering reasonably used its
patent power. 159
Finally, in analyzing whether the agreements were indeed an unfair
method of competition, the Eleventh Circuit found that the restrictions
on competition were ancillary restraints necessary to the settlement’s
utility and efficiency. 160 The court again relied on public policy support
for settlements to bolster its finding that the agreements were not
anticompetitive. 161 Because the agreement covered only the patents at
issue, the restraint was sufficiently narrow. 162 Further, the court

potential of the patent, the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope, and the resulting
anticompetitive effects).
156. Id. at 1069.
157. Id. at 1071 (citing Sierra Club, Inc. v. C.I.R., 86 F.3d 1526, 1531 (9th Cir. 1996)). The
court noted that the parties intended “royalty” to reflect its traditional meaning: payments made to
the owner of property for permitting another to use the property. Id.
158. See id. (citing Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); Aro
Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947
F.2d 469, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
159. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1072.
160. Id. The court noted that an ancillary restraint defines the parameters of an agreement to
prevent future litigation. See id. (“‘The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the
sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.’”
(quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir.
1986))). In addition, the court observed that the settlement agreement was a natural byproduct of
the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. at 1074 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). The court hypothesized that pre-Hatch-Waxman,
Upsher and ESI “would have had to enter the market with their products,” performed costly
clinical trials, produced, and marketed the drug before entering into a long and painful patent
infringement suit with Schering. Id. at 1073. Instead, Hatch-Waxman “essentially redistributes
the relative risk assessments.” Id.
161. Id. at 1072–73. The court stated that settlements provide many private and social
benefits. Id. at 1075 (citing Crane, supra note 51, at 760). The court also noted that patent
litigation costs $1 billion annually. Id. (citing Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust
Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 380 (1999)).
162. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1073. The court reasoned that the agreement did not
delay any other products. Id. Generally, the court reinforced its holding in Valley Drug: “‘It is
not obvious that competition was limited more than that lawful degree by paying potential
competitors for their exit . . . litigation is a much more costly mechanism to achieve exclusion,
both to the parties and to the public, than is settlement.’” Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
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rationalized that forbidding reverse payment settlements would reduce
the generic manufacturer’s incentive to challenge patents. 163
The Schering-Plough decision further solidified the Eleventh
Circuit’s reasoning in Valley Drug and entrenched the scope of the
patent test as an attractive way to analyze reverse payment
settlements. 164 The FTC, with the support of thirty-four states and a
patent policy think tank, sought Supreme Court review of the Eleventh
Circuit decision. The Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari,
leaving courts to choose between applying the scope of the patent test or
antitrust scrutiny to reverse payment settlements. 165
C. In re Tamoxifen Citrate: Making the Scope of the Patent Test
More Deferential
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s holdings in Valley Drug and
Schering-Plough, the Second Circuit found that a reverse payment
settlement within the scope of the patent did not violate antitrust
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, Barr
laws. 166
Laboratories (“Barr”) filed an ANDA relating to Zeneca, Inc.’s
(“Zeneca”) patent for Tamoxifen, prompting Zeneca to sue for patent
infringement. 167 The parties entered into a settlement agreement while
an appeal of the patent infringement suit was pending. 168 Pursuant to
the agreement, Zeneca would pay Barr $21 million and allow Barr to
sell Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen in the United States under Barr’s
label. 169 In return, Barr agreed not to market its own generic version
until Zeneca’s patent expired. 170
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)).
163. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1074.
164. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (applying the scope of the patent test); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466
F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).
165. Holman, supra note 6, at 491; Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note
52, at 55.
166. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 213.
167. Id. at 193. Imperial Chemical Industries (“ICI”) received a patent on Tamoxifen in
August 1985. Id. at 191. Zeneca obtained the rights to the patent and manufactured the drug. Id.
Tamoxifen was the most prescribed cancer drug in the world at the time. Id.
168. Id. In the patent infringement suit, the district court found that ICI intentionally withheld
crucial information from the PTO regarding safety and effectiveness tests, and therefore declared
the patent invalid. Id. (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., 795 F. Supp. 619, 626–
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). Specifically, the tests revealed hormonal effects “opposite to those sought
in humans,” which could lead to “unpredictable and at times disastrous consequences.” Imperial
Chem. Indus., PLC, 795 F. Supp. at 622.
169. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 193–94.
170. Id. To delay market entry, Barr changed its ANDA paragraph IV certification to a
paragraph III certification, removing the patent invalidity allegation. Brief for Plaintiffs
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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision, holding that
the reverse payment settlement was not anticompetitive. 171 The court,
in considering whether the reverse settlement payments were excessive,
observed that reverse payment settlements are facially “suspicious,”
especially when patentees settle litigation against potential generic
challengers by paying more than what the generic would earn if it
prevailed in the litigation and entered the market. 172 Further, the court
noted that “[s]o long as the law encourages settlements, weak patent
cases will likely be settled even though such settlements will inevitably
protect patent monopolies that are, perhaps, undeserved.” 173
Yet, the court reasoned that due to the presumption of patent validity,
the settlement legitimately extended the valid patent monopoly. 174 The
court held that as long as the patent litigation was not a sham, otherwise
baseless, or did not extend beyond the scope of the patent, the patentee
could legally enter into a reverse payment settlement. 175 The Second
Circuit analyzed Zeneca’s agreement and found it was neither
fraudulent nor baseless. 176 The court also determined that the
agreement did not exceed the patent’s scope. 177 Distinguishing the case
from In re Cardizem CD, the court noted that the settlement did not
restrict the marketing of non-infringing products. 178 The court added
that the settlement allowed other potential generics to challenge the
validity of the patent. 179 Further, the Second Circuit followed the

Appellants at 10, In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 037641). In addition, Zeneca would pay Barr’s raw materials supplier $9.5 million at the time and
an additional $35.9 million over the following ten years. Id. Further, if the court declared the
Tamoxifen patent invalid or unenforceable, Barr would be able to market the generic version of
the drug. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that Barr “understood” that it would seek to block any other
generic manufacturer’s attempt to market a generic version of Tamoxifen by invoking the 180day exclusivity period. Id. Five years later, only a few weeks before other generic manufacturers
could start marketing generic versions of Tamoxifen, Barr successfully invoked the start of the
180-exclusivity period as the first paragraph IV certification filer. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466
F.3d at 193–94. Barr did not begin marketing its own generic version because it could already
market Zeneca’s version, thereby preventing other manufacturers from entering the market. Id.
171. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 196–97.
172. Id. at 208. In fact, this is almost always the case, giving generic manufacturers a huge
incentive to settle. Leary, supra note 53, at 381.
173. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 211.
174. Id. at 211–12.
175. Id. at 208–09. This statement resulted in increased deference toward reverse payment
settlements. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 63.
176. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 213.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 213–14. The court reasoned that, because Zeneca’s patent precluded all generic
versions of Tamoxifen, another generic would also infringe the patent. Id.
179. Id. at 214–15.
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Eleventh Circuit’s lead by emphasizing public interest in settlements. 180
Though the court followed the Eleventh Circuit in finding the
agreements legal, Judge Pooler dissented. 181 Balancing the same
interests as the majority, Judge Pooler more heavily weighed the
significant public interest in testing weak patents, particularly because
of the impact of reverse payment settlements on health care costs.182
Respecting the importance of these public interests alongside those
favoring settlements, Judge Pooler reasoned that the court should apply
a reasonableness standard to consider the patent’s strength at the time of
settlement, the size of the payment, the amount the generic firm would
earn during its exclusivity period, and other anticompetitive effects. 183
D. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride: Entrenching the Scope of the
Patent Test as a Toothless Test
Like the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit applied
the scope of the patent test and found no antitrust violation in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation. 184 When Barr filed
an ANDA referencing Bayer’s drug, Cipro, Bayer sued Barr for patent
infringement. 185 The parties entered into a settlement agreement in
which Bayer agreed to pay Barr over $49 million to delay market entry

180. Id. at 202. The court explained, “‘[W]here a case is complex and expensive, and
resolution of the case will benefit the public, the public has a strong interest in settlement. The
trial court must protect the public interest, as well as the interests of the parties, by encouraging
the most fair and efficient resolution.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers,
Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856–57 (2nd Cir. 1998)). See also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056, 1071 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that scrutinizing settlements would disincentive generics
from challenging patents); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2003) (underlining that settlements are in the public’s interest).
181. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 221–32 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 225–26. Judge Pooler reasoned that the modern trend toward capping the amount
that insurers and public benefit plans spend on medication diminishes consumers’ access to
medications. Id.
183. Id. at 228. Judge Pooler concluded that plaintiffs’ pleading was sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss because they claimed: (1) The court would have affirmed the patent’s invalidity
determination; (2) Barr earned more money through settlement than it would have through
successful litigation; and (3) Barr agreed to “deploy its paragraph IV certification to defeat other
potential generic entrants.” Id.
184. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
185. Id. at 1327–28. Bayer owns U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444, which covers the compound
ciproflaxin hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Cipro, a drug that treats bacterial illnesses. Id.
Barr asserted that the patent was invalid based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103,
obviousness type double patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (supplying the conditions for patentability for non-obvious
subject matter); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
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until six months before Bayer’s patent expired. 186 In addition, Bayer
agreed to provide Barr with Cipro for resale or to make quarterly
payments to Barr for five years. 187
Similar to the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit
found that the payments did not violate federal antitrust laws. 188 The
Federal Circuit began its analysis by stressing the general public policy
favoring patent litigation settlements, adding that patent litigation
settlements usually require the alleged infringer to refrain from
challenging the patent’s validity. 189 Applying the presumption of
validity principle, the court reasoned that the patent confers a power to
exclude others from profiting from the patented product. 190 Further, it
noted that the agreements only prevented Barr from benefiting from the
patent and therefore, fell within Bayer’s rights as the patentee.191
Finally, the court agreed with the Second and Eleventh Circuits’
conclusions that courts must analyze whether the anticompetitive effects
exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent 192 and, absent sham or
186. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1328–29. See also 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) (2006) (providing for paragraph III certification).
187. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1329. After Bayer and Barr entered into
a consent decree, four companies filed paragraph IV certifications, and Bayer sued each for patent
infringement. Id.
188. See id. at 1332–35 (reviewing the district court’s analysis and finding no error). The
district court granted Bayer’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Bayer had legitimate
market power in the ciprofloxacin market. Id. at 1330. The court reasoned that any
anticompetitive effects from the agreement remained “within the exclusionary zone” of the patent
and thus, it could “not be redressed by antitrust law.” Id. Applying analysis from the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, the district court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that a patent’s exclusionary
power should be “tempered by the patent’s potential invalidity.” In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 520–40 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
189. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1333. The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of federal district courts in patent cases where the
trial court’s jurisdiction “was based, in whole or in part” on 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(1) (2006). It is essentially a national appellate court for patents. Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The
New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part I), J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 178,
186 (1982). Unsurprisingly, because it has favored patent settlements over competition, the
Federal Circuit has been criticized for eroding antitrust laws. See Scott A. Stempel & John F.
Terzaken III, Casting a Long IP Shadow over Antitrust Jurisprudence: The Federal Circuit’s
Expanding Jurisdictional Reach, 69 ANTIRUST L.J. 711, 711 (2002). In general, “many observers
believe that the creation of the Federal Circuit has led to decisions more favorable to patent
holders.” Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 75, 79
(2005) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents].
190. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1337. See also In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the patent confers a right to
exclude); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
191. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1332–33.
192. Id. at 1336. The court added that when the “anticompetitive effects of the settlement
agreement are within the exclusionary power of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the
court” applies a “rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive effects, or under patent
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fraud, “the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the
antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse
payment.” 193 By following the Eleventh Circuit’s lead, the Second and
Federal Circuits further tilted the balance away from any vigorous
antitrust analysis of reverse payment settlements. 194
E. In re K-Dur: Rejecting the Scope of the Patent Test
In In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit reviewed the
same settlement agreement that the Eleventh Circuit had reviewed in
Schering-Plough, but reached an opposite conclusion. 195 Contrary to
the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, the Third Circuit began its
analysis by noting the cost of reverse payment settlements to
consumers, rather than highlighting the potential cost of discouraging
settlements. 196 The court decided against applying the scope of the
law by analyzing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.” Id.
193. Id. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 208–09 (holding that the court need not
apply antitrust scrutiny where the settlement was not fraudulent or otherwise baseless).
194. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1340 (finding payments permissible
despite not applying antitrust scrutiny); In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 220 (refraining from
applying antitrust analysis because of the presumption of patent validity); Schering-Plough Corp.,
402 F.3d at 1075 (holding that, without a showing of sham or fraud, a reverse payment does not
violate antitrust laws if it exists within the scope of the patent); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court must consider the
exclusionary scope of the patent to determine whether an antitrust violation occurred).
195. Compare In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the
settlement agreements were anticompetitive), with Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1074
(finding settlement agreements were not anticompetitive). The Third Circuit’s occasion to review
the same settlement agreements arose when, separate from the FTC’s challenge, various private
parties filed antitrust suits targeting the settlements. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated those suits before the District of New Jersey. Id.
The Special Master certified a class of plaintiffs of forty-four wholesalers and retailers who
purchased K-Dur directly from Schering. Id. at 207–08. In the Special Master’s Report and
Recommendation, he applied the presumption that Schering’s patent was valid, giving Schering
the right to exclude infringing products until the end of the term through the reverse payment
settlements. Special Master’s Amended Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motions
for Summary Judgment as to the Upsher and ESI Settlements and Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’
Partial Motions for Summary Judgment as to the Applicable Framework for Analysis of
Exclusion Payments and the Exclusionary Scope of the ’743 Patent at 24–26, In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 01-1652) [hereinafter Special Master’s
Amended Report]. Adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion, the Special Master
found that the settlements would only be subject to antitrust scrutiny if: (1) they exceeded the
scope of the patent, or (2) the underlying patent infringement suits were objectively baseless. Id.
Because the settlement agreements did not fit into either of these categories, the Special Master
recommended granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which the district court
adopted in full. Id.; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 2d 688 (J.P.M.L. 2001).
196. Compare In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 (focusing on the cost of reverse payments to the
public), with In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1333 (emphasizing the public policy
in favor of settlements); In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 202 (same); Schering-Plough Corp.,
402 F.3d at 1071 (same); Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1307–08 (same).
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patent test, holding that it both fails to subject reverse payment
settlements to antitrust scrutiny and ignores the policies underlying the
Hatch-Waxman Act and Supreme Court precedent concerning patent
litigation and competition. 197
To begin, the court explained that the scope of the patent test created
an “almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity,” which
presupposed the issue in the patent suit. 198 The Third Circuit observed
that when a court presumes that patent validity extends to the patent
holder’s ability to exclude competitors from the market, it forgets that
the presumption of patent validity is a procedural device, rather than a
substantive conclusion. 199 More importantly, a court ignores that the
underlying suit concerns a patent infringement case, not patent
validity. 200 The key distinction is that in a patent infringement suit, the
patent holder bears the burden of demonstrating infringement, whereas
in a patent validity lawsuit, the challenger bears the burden of proof. 201
Instead, the court offered empirical and legal support for the public
interest in judicial testing and eliminating weak patents.202 The court
cited an FTC study showing that generic challengers prevailed seventythree percent of the time in Hatch-Waxman challenges made under
paragraph IV certifications. 203 Though the ability for subsequent patent

197. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
198. Id.
199. Id. “The presumption, like all legal presumptions, is a procedural device, not substantive
law.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroqip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
200. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214. When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification, the manufacturer effectively “infringes” on the patent, giving the
patentee the right to sue for patent infringement. 1 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006). See supra note
48 and accompanying text. In response to the patent infringement suit, the generic manufacturer
typically counterclaims by alleging the patent is invalid. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at
1299.
201. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
679 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
202. See id. at 215 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01
(1993)) (noting both the public policy in resolving questions of patent validity and the danger of
granting monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid patents). The court reasoned that patent
laws embody “‘a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy.’” Id. at 216 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a patent
“affords no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)). The Court also has announced, “‘It is as
important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.’” Id. (quoting Pope
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
203. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (citing FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION 16 (2002)). See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases – An
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challengers to eliminate weak patents assuaged the Second Circuit’s
concerns, the Third Circuit was not convinced. Instead, the Third
Circuit found that the settlement actually removes the most motivated
challenger because the first challenger has the potential to secure the
180-day marketing exclusivity period. 204 Additionally, the patent
holder may still settle with the subsequent challengers. 205 In reality,
allowing reverse payment settlements does not reward patent holders
based on the strength of their patents, but rather, on the “strength of
[their] wallets.” 206
Further, the Third Circuit found that U.S. Supreme Court precedent
supports freeing the competitive economy of narrow or invalid
patents. 207 The Third Circuit looked at Edward Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., where the Supreme Court
analyzed whether a patentee could contractually prohibit a patent
licensor from challenging the validity of the patent under a licensing
agreement that also included a price-fixing provision. 208 The Court
found that the patentee could not stop the licensor from challenging the
patent because the price-fixing agreement would violate federal antitrust
law if the patent were invalid. 209 In its opinion, the Court found support
in the public policy behind freeing the competitive economy in the
patent context. 210 The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur found that the
Empirical Peek inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000) (reporting that alleged
infringers prevailed in forty-two percent of patent cases that reached trial from 1983 to 1999).
204. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006) (providing the
180-day marketing exclusivity provision).
205. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215. See e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702
F. Supp. 2d 514, 521–22 (involving a brand-name manufacturer that settled infringement suits
with four different generic challengers).
206. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (quoting Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at
1614).
207. Id. at 215–16.
[T]he judicial preference for settlement, while generally laudable, should not displace
countervailing public policy objectives or, in this case, Congress’s determination—
which is evidence from the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the statements in
the legislative record that litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect consumers
from unjustified monopolies by name brand drug manufacturers.
Id. at 217.
208. 329 U.S. 394, 401 (1947). The court sought to expound on Supreme Court precedent
supporting testing of weak patents. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216.
209. Edward Katzinger Co., 329 U.S. at 401–02. The Court reasoned that it would have
“permitted a licensor to be protected on an illegal contract.” Id. at 399.
210. The court explained the “necessity of protecting our competitive economy by keeping
open the way for interested persons to challenge the validity of patents which might be shown to
be invalid.” Id. at 400 (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalue Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)). The
court reiterated the policy that “it is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.”
Id. at 401 (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944)).
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Edward Katzinger Co. applied to reverse
payments because reverse payments allow the brand-name manufacturer
and generic manufacturer to share monopoly rents without providing the
public with any assurance of the underlying patent’s validity. 211
Weighing policies supporting settlements and competition, the Third
Circuit reasoned that antitrust analysis must pay particular attention to
the “distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to
which it applies.” 212 The court referred to the legislative intent behind
Hatch-Waxman as evidence that the court should apply antitrust
analysis to reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical
industry. 213
Finally, the court articulated a test for district courts to follow in
future reverse payment cases. 214 First, the court need not review the
merits of the underlying patent infringement suit because “it is logical to
conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the
generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise
reasonable litigation compromise.” 215 The patent holder may then

Moreover, that the right to challenge a patent “‘is not only a private right to the individual, but it
is founded on public policy which is promoted by his making the defense, and contravened by his
refusal to make it.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 235 (1892)).
211. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216. See also United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (implying that a settlement agreement might be
anticompetitive if it “give[s] potential competitors incentives to remain in cartels rather than
turning to another product, inventing around the patent, or challenging its validity”). The Third
Circuit observed that the Special Master overlooked these aspects of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216. Notably, the Special Master in this case expressly
followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit in making his recommendation, which the district court
adopted in full. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2001); Special
Master’s Amended Report, supra note 195, at 24–26.
212. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004)). See generally Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements, supra note 52, at 68 (arguing that courts should adopt the reasoning in Trinko to the
pharmaceutical industry).
213. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 216–17. In addition, the Third Circuit noted that applying the
rule of reason test to reverse payments from the brand-name manufacturer to the generic
challenger would not affect the majority of other pharmaceutical patent settlements because
seventy-five percent of Hatch-Waxman Act infringement suits settled in 2010 did so without
reverse payments. Id. at 218 (citing 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2).
214. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. The court adopted a test similar to that applied in Andrx
Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, 256 F.3d 799, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See
infra Part V (arguing that the Supreme Court should adopt this test).
215. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218 (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988
(2003) (italics omitted)). See Holman, supra note 6, at 558–59 (noting that the court and the FTC
generally agree that an analysis of the validity of the underlying patent is unnecessary). The FTC
has made clear that an analysis of patent validity would be inappropriate:
An after-the-fact inquiry by the Commission into the merits of the underlying litigation
is not only unlikely to be particularly helpful, but also likely to be unreliable. As a
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attempt to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case of an unreasonable restraint
of trade by demonstrating that there was no reverse payment because
the settlement amount was consideration for something other than a
delay in market entry. 216 As a second defense, the patent holder may
argue that the reverse payment offers a competitive benefit that could
not have been achieved without a reverse payment. 217
In sum, while the D.C. Circuit in Andrx and the Sixth Circuit in In re
Cardizem CD applied strict antitrust scrutiny to reverse payment
settlements, all other circuit courts have applied a scope of the patent
test until the recent Third Circuit decision. Having reviewed the same
settlement agreement as the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough, the
Third Circuit decision in In re K-Dur created a circuit split that
highlights the importance of the Supreme Court’s upcoming resolution
of this complex issue in Actavis. 218
III. ANALYSIS
This Part evaluates why the scope of the patent test (as applied by the
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits) is an inappropriate analytical
tool for reverse payment settlements because it ignores the antitrust
harm of these settlements, arbitrarily favors settlements over the often
overlooked strong public interest in competition, and fails to adequately
account for the legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Next, this
Part contends that the Third Circuit’s antitrust analysis has presented the
best method to analyze reverse payment settlements.

general matter, tribunals decide patent issues in the context of a true adversary
proceeding, and their opinions are informed by the arguments of opposing counsel.
Once a case settles, however, the interests of the formerly contending parties are
aligned. A generic competitor that has agreed to delay its entry no longer has an
incentive to attack vigorously the validity of the patent in issue or a claim of
infringement.
In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 997 (2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005).
216. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
217. Id.
218. See Jon Leibowitz, Remarks of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz as Prepared for Delivery at
the Sixth Annual Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium at 4 (Sept. 19,
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/120919jdlgeorgetownspeech.pdf
(“[T]here is a clear circuit split on the legality of pay-for-delay deals between the Third (and
possibly the Sixth and the D.C. Circuits), on the one hand, and the Second, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits on the other.”); Edward Wyatt, Justices to Take Up Generic Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2012, at B1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the pay-for-delay case and
its importance to the industry and U.S. consumers).
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A. Presumption of Patent Validity
The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits improperly interpreted
the presumption of patent validity in the previously discussed case
law. 219 The Patent Act states that patents “shall be presumed valid.” 220
However, this presumption is merely procedural and governs the order
in which parties carry the burden of proof. 221 When courts presume
that the patent in question is valid in reverse payment cases, they never
reach the issue of whether the patent is valid and infringed. 222 Instead,
courts using the scope of the patent test essentially make every PTO
decision a final one. 223 This is dangerous because, as the Third Circuit
noted in In re K-Dur, many of the patents the PTO issues are later found
invalid. 224 Citing the FTC, the Third Circuit observed that generic drug

219. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“[I]n the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need
not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement agreement involving
a reverse payment.”); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Unless and until the patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or a suit of its enforcement
is shown to be objectively baseless, there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing
antitrust law, as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent.”); ScheringPlough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding reverse payments legal
because they did not exceed the patents); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (instructing the district court to consider the scope of the
patent and whether the agreements exceeded the scope).
220. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). See sources cited in note 88 and accompanying text (describing
the burdens and presumptions of patent validity). See also George W. Jordan III, Managing the
Presumption of Patent Validity, 4 LANDSLIDE 50, 50–51 (2012) (discussing the impact of
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership on the presumption of patent validity).
221. Note that the Federal Circuit, which also employed the scope of the patent test, has made
this observation. See supra note 199. See also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at
1336 (using the procedural presumption of patent validity to come to a substantive conclusion on
an issue of antitrust law). As one scholar recently explained, a “presumption of validity does not
entitle a patentee to evade the test of patent litigation any more than a criminal defendant’s
presumption of innocence entitles him to avoid trial.” Corrected Brief for Amici Curiae of 28
Professors of Law, Business, and Economics in Support of Appellants at 12, In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097).
222. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
679 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
223. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“A patent, in the last analysis, simply
represents a legal conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”).
224. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (“Many patents issued by the PTO are later found to be
invalid or not infringed . . . .”). Many economists and scholars previously thought of patents as
definite property rights, which tended to be valid, and conferred power of market control over
product improvement or a low-cost method of production. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION,
GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 64 (1969).
More recently, economists and scholars have observed that the empirical evidence regarding the
issuance of patents undermines this theory of patent validity. See Lemley & Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, supra note 189, at 75–76 (“Nearly half of all litigated patents are found to
be invalid, including some of great commercial significance.”).
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companies prevailed in seventy-three percent of challenges between
1992 and 2000 in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits. 225 In addition, courts
invalidated forty-six percent of patents between 1989 and 1996, 226 and
alleged infringers prevailed in forty-two percent of patent cases
reaching trial between 1983 and 1999. 227
Moreover, determining whether the patent is valid is critical to the
outcome of the antitrust analysis. If the patent is valid, then the brandname pharmaceutical company can exclude others from that specific
product’s market for the life of the patent. 228 If the patent is invalid,
however, the patented drug does not have any scope at all, and the
manufacturer has no right to exclude other manufacturers from the
market. 229
The Third Circuit, therefore, properly reasoned that extending this
analysis to reverse payment settlements is especially dangerous because
settlements prevent any factfinder from considering the validity of the
patent. 230 The Second Circuit incorrectly reasoned that other generic

225. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (citing FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION 16 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 FTC STUDY]). Sales were far higher in the cases in
which brand-name firms sued generics. 2002 FTC STUDY, supra, at 16. “For the seventy-five
drug products subject to litigation, the first generic applicant gained $190 million in median net
sales the year it filed its ANDA,” and “most of the twenty-nine new drug applications not subject
to suit had net sales of less than $100 million in the year of filing.” Id. But see RBC CAPITAL
MKTS., PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010), available at
http://www.amlawdaily.typepad.com/pharmareport.pdf (reporting that from 2000 to 2009,
generics prevailed in forty-eight percent of patent validity challenges that went to trial).
226. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 184, 205 (1998) (reviewing cases resulting in a final judgment of
validity). The process of patent approval provides some insight as to why so many patents are
later found invalid. For example, the PTO carries the burden to offer a reason not to issue a
patent sought by a patent applicant. Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 189, at
78. For further exploration of how the patent application process can later produce many patent
invalidity determinations, see id. at 78–79.
227. Moore, supra note 203, at 385.
228. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 139 (2000) (“[T]he patent law model we have is quite simple: the
government issues you a patent; the patent gives you the right to exclude . . . .”); Mark A. Lemley
& Phillip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV.
783, 783 (2007) (basing their economic analysis on the principle that the “foundational notion of
property law is that ‘the right to exclude’ is the essence of a true property right”).
229. See Carrier, “Scope of the Patent” Test, supra note 139, at 6 (pointing out the
inadequacies of the scope of the patent test); Leary, Antitrust Issues, supra note 28 (warning that
collusive agreements to share monopoly profits from an invalid patent threaten especially severe
anticompetitive harm).
230. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (“[W]e question the assumption underlying the view of
the Second Circuit and other courts that subsequent challenges by other generic manufacturers
will suffice to eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse payment to the initial
challenger.”).
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drug manufacturers would work to eliminate weak patents. 231 To the
contrary, other generic manufacturers may not adequately challenge the
patent because settling with the first filer naturally removes the most
motivated challenger. 232 In addition, the settling innovator firm can,
and often does, pay off multiple challengers at once. 233
B. Policy Arguments: Balancing Settlement and Innovation with
Judicial Testing and Competition
While courts applying the scope of the patent test have found support
in public policy arguments for innovation and settlements, they have not
properly weighed the public policy arguments for challenging invalid
patents and promoting competition. 234 Even though the underlying
reason courts generally give to support settlement is cost efficiency, 235
231. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2006) (“‘[W]hile
the strategy of paying off a generic company to drop its patent challenge would work to exclude
that particular competitor from the market, it would have no effect on other challengers of the
patent, whose incentive to mount a challenge would also grow commensurately with the chance
that the patent would be held invalid.’” (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 363 F. Supp. 514, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2005))).
232. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1584–86 (positing that settling the
patent litigation removes the most motivated challenger because of the potential for 180 days of
marketing exclusivity); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1758 (2003) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement] (noting that even with this rationality, payments
can be anticompetitive); Joel Schrag, The Value of a Second Bite at the Apple: The Effect of
Patent Dispute Settlements on Entry and Consumer Welfare 3–4 (FTC, Working Paper No. 281,
2006) (maintaining that reverse payment settlements undermine subsequent generic
manufacturer’s incentive to challenge the patent, thereby harming consumers).
233. King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521–22 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (applying the scope of the patent test and finding no antitrust violation with a drug
manufacturer paying four generic firms to delay market entry for large payments, supply
agreements, and research and development plans). See also In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (“[T]he
high profit margins of a monopolist drug manufacturer may enable it to pay off a whole series of
challengers rather than suffer the possible loss of its patent through litigation.”).
234. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217 (maintaining that the legislative intent of HatchWaxman and the countervailing public policy interests in competition and judicial testing of weak
patents displace any general policy for settlement).
235. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (noting the “long-standing policy in the law” favoring patent settlements); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 202 (reasoning that the court must encourage the most efficient
resolution of costly disputes); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308
(11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that patent litigation is especially costly, time-consuming, and creates
too much uncertainty). The Eleventh Circuit declared that the general policy to encourage
settlements applies equally to patent infringement suits. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308;
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005). The Schering court further
reasoned that “‘litigation is a much more costly mechanism to achieve exclusion, both to the
parties and to the public, than is settlement.’” Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1073 (quoting
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003)). This reasoning
is flawed in the first instance because it presumes that exclusion will ultimately occur, regardless
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these courts overlook that antitrust law also saves the public money by
protecting the basic rules of competition to keep prices low, production
efficient, and innovation robust. 236 Specifically, early competition
benefits consumers because it lowers drug prices sooner. 237 Reverse
payment settlements merely transfer “wealth from consumers to drug
makers, in the form of continued high pharmaceutical prices, with
brand-name firms sharing a portion of that transfer with the generic
firm.” 238
Although settling patent litigation cases may save major
pharmaceutical companies substantial sums of money, 239 consumer
welfare losses from delayed generic drug market entry are eighty-five

whether the path is litigation or settlement. Offering another perspective, some commentators
point out that judges have a “reflex” favoring settlement, in part because judges may want to
avoid highly technical pharmaceutical patent cases. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at
1574.
236. WHINSTON, supra note 65, at 1; Scott C. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust:
Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629
(2009) [hereinafter Hemphill, Aggregate Approach].
237. Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 236, at 636. Hemphill explains that the
benefit to the consumer of lower drug prices is probabilistic because the brand-name firm could
win the patent infringement suit.
Settlements without payment reflect the perceived strength of the patent. For
example, a generic firm’s fifty percent chance of success would yield, roughly
speaking, an entry date halfway between immediate entry and patent expiration. That
result is equal to average result of litigation, in which the consumer has a fifty percent
chance of receiving no benefit. By contrast, bargains that reflect not only perceived
patent strength but also payments from brand-name to generic manufacturers will
induce the generic firm to accept a later entry date, which decreases consumer welfare.
Id. at 635–36. For an explanation of how the 180-day exclusivity period affects this calculation,
see Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1588–94.
238. Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 236, at 636. In addition, high pharmaceutical
drug costs force consumers and insurance providers to adjust purchasing decisions, which also
contributes to consumer welfare loss. Id. Hemphill explains,
In an ordinary market, setting a price above marginal cost produces an allocative
distortion and accompanying welfare loss for consumers, because consumers who
value the good above its marginal cost, but below the prevailing price, are deflected to
less desired substitutes. To the extent that public and private insurance secures the
purchase of a drug, this distortion is reduced, though it is not eliminated (as insurance
is incomplete). Moreover, the higher price produces new distortions (and hence
inefficiency) in the decisionmaking process of the insurance provider, through
decisions to charge higher premiums and not to reimburse drugs whose value exceeds
their marginal cost. In a similar manner, the existence of incomplete insurance affects
the assessment of the size of the transfer.
Id. at 636 n.21.
239. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005, at
22 (2005) (reporting that median expense of patent litigation was $4.5 million, compared to $25
million of risk); Carlson, supra note 161, at 380 (finding that U.S. patent litigation costs $1
billion annually).
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times greater than the loss the public suffers from costly litigation.240
Even though courts favor settlements because they benefit the public,
the courts found that settling parties owe no duty to “preserve the
public’s interest in lower prices.” 241 In essence, these courts reason that
cost efficiency matters at the courts, but not at the pharmacy. 242
Similarly unpersuasive, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
have warned that scrutinizing patent settlements could hinder patent
innovation, the foundation of patent law. 243 The Supreme Court has
declared that patent law also strongly supports the public interest in
testing patents as a way to promote innovation and prevent invalid
patent holders from maintaining monopolies. 244 The Court also has
explained that patent laws must recognize that “imitation and
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.” 245
Further, when a court faces two competing policies in an antitrust
lawsuit, it must scrutinize the regulatory framework and legislative
intent to determine its course of action. 246 Specifically, the Supreme

240. See Robert Kneuper, Four Economic Principles underlying the FTC’s Position against
Reverse Payments in Patent Settlement Agreements, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Jan. 2006, at 1.
As noted, the FTC reports that reverse payments cost the American public $3.5 billion a year.
2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
241. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541 (E.D.N.Y.
2005). The court also declared that the public has “no public property right in the outcome of
private lawsuits.” Id. at 531.
242. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts that cite cost
efficiency as the public policy behind settling patent disputes).
243. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that finding settlements anticompetitive would increase
enforcement efforts and hinder innovation because of “uncertainty around the drug
manufacturer’s ability to research, develop, and market the patented product.” Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005). The Second and Eleventh Circuits noted
that “severely restricting” settlements could “heighten the uncertainty” and “delay innovation.”
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). Patent policies favor settlements
because they increase the patentees’ profits, which increase the patentee’s incentive to innovate.
Crane, supra note 51, at 749.
244. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993). Congress
designed the Patent Act to encourage innovation, but it also reflects the “important public interest
in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public
domain.” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
245. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). In fact, the
Court stated that the public interest for a patent system also includes a private right of the
individual to challenge a patent. Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chi. Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394,
401 (1947).
246. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
411–12 (2004) (“Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular structure and
circumstances of the industry at issue.”); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86,
91 (1975) (holding that “careful account must be taken of the pervasive federal and state
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Court has instructed that “‘[a]ntitrust analysis must sensitively
recognize the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated
industry to which it applies.’” 247 The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur
recognized that the scope of the patent test encourages settlement—a
policy the court has historically supported. 248 However, the Third
Circuit properly reasoned that a general preference for settlement should
not displace a specific congressional determination or opposing public
policy objectives unique to the pharmaceutical industry. 249
Because Hatch-Waxman explicitly balances the same interests that
courts have struggled to balance in reverse payment cases, the
legislative intent of the Act should control a court’s holding. 250
Statements of Senator Hatch and Representative Waxman reveal that
reverse payment settlements disrupt the balance between competition
and innovation that they designed by weighing far more heavily on the
side of innovation. 251 Subverting Hatch-Waxman’s goals, brand-name
regulation characteristic of the industry”).
247. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411–12 (quoting Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
248. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Ehrheart v.
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010)). But see Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements, supra note 52, at 61 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme displaces
any general preference in the law for settlement); cf. Brief Amici Curiae of 78 Intellectual
Property Law, Antitrust Law, Economics, and Business Professors in Support of Appellant at 5,
Karyn McGaughey v. Bayer Corp., No. D056361, 2010 WL 6275183 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010)
(urging the court to condemn reverse payment settlements, in part, because they subvert the
purpose of Hatch-Waxman).
249. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217. The court further noted that it would only apply antitrust
scrutiny to reverse payment settlements from brand-name manufacturers to generic
manufacturers. Id. at 218. It reasoned that narrowly applying antitrust scrutiny would leave the
majority of pharmaceutical patent settlements unaffected. Id. (citing 2011 FTC REPORT, supra
note 7, at 2). An FTC study reported that seventy-five percent of Hatch-Waxman Act
infringement suits settled in 2010 without reverse payments. Id. Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory
framework shows that it intended to promote patent challenges because it offered a 180-day
period of marketing exclusivity for the first ANDA filer to seek to enter before the end of the
patent term. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). See supra Part I.B (explaining the key
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act). The patentees also have incentive to file suit after
receiving notice of the paragraph IV certification because they will receive a thirty-month stay.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05273).
250. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 62 (arguing that any
fear of hindering innovation is secondary in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
251. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713,
2715 (underscoring that the bill completes “what the Congress has traditionally done in the area
of intellectual property law[:] balance the need to stimulate innovation against the goal of
furthering the public interest”); 130 CONG. REC. 24425 (Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) (highlighting the “fundamental balance of the bill”). See also Hemphill, Paying for
Delay, supra note 7, at 1614 (noting that Congress took explicit steps to fill the gaps where
innovators sought to set innovation policy by self-help through reverse payments).
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manufacturers with weak patents who are unlikely to prevail in court
benefit the most from reverse payments. 252 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit appropriately emphasized that allowing reverse payment
settlements is “bad policy from the perspective of the consumer,
precisely the constituency Congress was seeking to protect.”253
Therefore, the Third Circuit was correct to favor competition in the
pharmaceutical drug market over reverse payment settlements.
In response to arguments that courts should consider the legislative
intent of Hatch-Waxman, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
reasoned that the reverse payment settlements were a natural byproduct
of Hatch-Waxman. 254 Reverse payment settlements, however, are an
unintended consequence of Hatch-Waxman and counteract the explicit
intent of the Act. 255 In broadly analogizing to antitrust principles, one
commentator notes that the law would not permit rival companies to
collude simply because doing so takes little effort. 256 Similarly, simply
252. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing
reverse payment settlements, while recognizing the reality that they disproportionately reward
brand-name manufacturers with weak patents). See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 213 (summarizing
the Second Circuit’s holding that the judicial preference for settlements counterbalanced the
troubling result of upholding the validity of reverse payment settlements).
253. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217. The fact that Congress was seeking to protect the public
interest in creating Hatch-Waxman is especially important in the context of patent law, where the
public interest is paramount. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665
(1944) (describing the determination of patent validity as a matter of “the protection of the public
in a system of free enterprise”).
254. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 206 (pointing out that reverse payment
settlements were “particularly to be expected in the drug-patent context because the HatchWaxman Act created an environment that encourages them”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Indeed, a sizable exclusion payment
from the patent holder to the generic manufacturer is not unexpected under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, where the relative risks of litigation are redistributed.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402
F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the relative risk
assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their magnitude.”).
255. See 148 CONG. REC. 15354 (July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (explaining that
“[w]e did not wish to encourage situations where payments were made to generic firms not to sell
generic drugs and not to allow multi-source generic competition”); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Antitrust Institute and 26 Professors in Support of Appellants and Reversal at 11, In re
K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 3011) (No. 10-2078, 10-2077, 10-2079) (noting that
Hatch-Waxman did not intend for parties to settle in this manner); Timothy A. Weil, Devising a
Legislative Solution to the Reverse Payment Dilemma: How Congress Can Balance Competition,
Innovation, and the Public Policy Favoring the Settlement of Disputes without Litigation, 55 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 741, 742 (2011) (“Settlement agreements between brand-name drug manufacturers
and generic firms have limited the type of generic competition the Hatch-Waxman Act was
designed to encourage.”).
256. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 66–67 (arguing that the
courts’ reliance on reverse payment settlements as a natural product of Hatch-Waxman is
unfounded). Further, he noted that this line of reasoning exemplifies the flawed reasoning of the
courts reviewing reverse payment cases. Id.
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because Hatch-Waxman allows for parties to make reverse payments
does not mean that such settlements do not violate antitrust laws. 257
The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits improperly applied the
scope of the patent test to reverse payment settlements. 258 By
disregarding the explicit intent of Hatch-Waxman, favoring policies of
settlement over competition, and giving the presumption of patent
validity more weight than it is entitled, these courts have essentially
made reverse payment settlements per se legal. 259 Doing so has cost the
American public millions of dollars. 260 Fortunately, the In re K-Dur
court wisely rejected the scope of the patent test and instead applied
antitrust scrutiny. 261
C. Applying Antitrust Scrutiny
After rejecting the scope of the patent test, the Third Circuit in In re
K-Dur properly instructed the lower court to apply a quick look rule of
reason analysis instead of a traditional rule of reason or per se
analysis. 262 The majority of courts have correctly rejected the per se
approach, though the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit have misapplied
this test to reverse payment settlements. 263 Per se treatment is
257. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1577–78 (“True, paying for delay is
‘natural,’ in the sense that the result is not unexpected given the incentives of the parties; the
parties if not legally constrained, will prefer pay-for-delay settlement to litigation. But that fact in
no way justifies payments for delay.”); Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note
232, at 1758 (observing that because the law allows reverse payments to occur does not immunize
them from antitrust liability).
258. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 11–15, In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Nos. 05-2851cv(L), 05-2852-cv(CON), 05-2863-cv(CON)) (arguing that the test the court applied in In re
Tamoxifen “distorts the statutory process that leads to competition in the face of patent claims”).
259. Non-Confidential Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2008-1097) (arguing that
courts applying the scope of the patent test have found reverse payments per se legal and urging
against this holding).
260. 2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (concluding that reverse payments cost the
American public $3.5 billion a year). See Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 236, at 651
(finding that reverse payment settlements cost the American public up to $12 billion annually).
261. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012).
262. Id. at 218. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Antitrust Institute and 26 Professors,
supra note 255, at 14–15 (arguing that reverse payments are presumptively illegal).
263. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1332 (rejecting the per se approach);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005) (same); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same). But see In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding reverse payment settlements per se
legal because restricting patent settlements might hinder innovation); In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding reverse payment settlements per se
illegal because a reduction in competition was sufficient to demonstrate an anticompetitive

5_KUTCHER.DOCX

1136

4/18/2013 11:14 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

inappropriate because it ignores the weight of the patent holder’s proper
right to exclude. 264 Considering the balance necessary to promote
innovation and preserve competition, it is important to recognize the
patentee’s true rights under patent law, which counsel against adopting
a per se rule. 265
Further, the Supreme Court largely resists the use of per se rules. 266
The Court has cautioned against using per se rules until the “judiciary
obtains considerable rule-of-reason experience with the particular type
of restraint challenged.” 267 Here, although the reverse payment
problem has engendered much press and attention, relatively few courts
have considered the legality of such agreements. Still further, the few
courts that have heard reverse payment cases have actually applied
antitrust scrutiny. 268 In addition, the antitrust defendants could
effect); cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39
U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 25–26 (2004) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust] (arguing that
applying a per se rule is inappropriate, but pointing out that it may have been justified in In re
Cardizem CD because of the facts).
264. Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1039 (2004).
265. See Kristopher L. Reed, A Return to Reason: Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical
Settlements under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 457, 475 (2004–05) (noting that
commentators who advocate a strict per se approach misunderstand patent laws). For example,
some commentators argue that without a final court resolution of validity and scope of the patent,
a patentee’s right is uncertain. Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent
Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 35 n.9 (2004). While
patents do not allow patentees to pay competitors not to enter the market outside the scope of the
patent, they do offer the power to “exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention” for the patent term. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). However, supporters of the per
se rule note that approximately half of all patents are invalidated. Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T.
Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective
on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 46 IDEA 1, 11–12 (2005). Though the
Eleventh Circuit improperly extended the presumption of patent validity to prevent any antitrust
analysis, patents are still entitled to the procedural presumption of patent validity under the
Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). The patent owner bears the burden of
proving infringement. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889
(Fed. Cir. 1988). For more commentary arguing that reverse payments should be per se illegal,
see Davis, supra note 83, at 255; O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives Approach, supra note 83, at
1787; Sandoval, supra note 83, at 141.
266. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (resisting the application of a per se rule
to a horizontal price-fixing agreement); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
349 n.19 (1982) (same).
267. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. at 349 n.19. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972) (“It is only after considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations . . . .”).
268. Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Note, Settlements between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical
Companies: A Reasonable Antitrust Analysis of Reverse Payments, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883,
1909 (2006). Yet, some argue that Congress should adopt a per se rule, which would sidestep the
courts’ perceived inexperience. See Ken Letzler & Sonia Pfaffenroth, Patent Settlement
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potentially justify a reverse payment if it reflected the parties’
reasonable assessments of patent validity. 269 Therefore, the Third
Circuit and other courts have properly rejected applying the per se rule
to reverse payments. 270
The Third Circuit also appropriately decided against applying a rule
of reason analysis to reverse payments. 271 Because reverse payment
settlements are generally anticompetitive, a rule of reason analysis
would be illogical. 272 If courts applied the rule of reason analysis, the
plaintiff would be required to demonstrate the anticompetitive effect of
the defendant’s conduct by offering proof of the defendant’s market
share. 273 Plaintiffs, however, usually cannot make this showing
because it carries a heavy evidentiary and financial burden. 274
Moreover, reverse payment settlements tend to be anticompetitive,
rendering a full-blown, expensive, onerous rule of reason analysis
unnecessary. 275 Absent countervailing public policy concerns and the
Legislation: Good Medicine or Wrong Prescription?, 23 ANTITRUST 81, 83 (2009) (“[S]upporters
would argue that this is a routine application of the per se rule to an agreement not to compete.”).
269. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 67 (arguing that per se
invalidity is inappropriate). See also MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 56
(2009) (explaining that courts apply per se treatment to price fixing, bid rigging, and marketallocation agreements, which are likely to engender competitive harm and unlikely to offer
competitive benefits); O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives Approach, supra note 83, at 1784–86
(describing potential objective indicators of patent validity).
270. See Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1735 (arguing that
the per se rule is inappropriate in the context of reverse payment settlements).
271. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 67 (arguing that
reverse payments settlements should be presumptively illegal); Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive
Settlement, supra note 232, at 1729 (arguing that rule of reason approach does not make sense in
the context of reverse payment settlements). But see Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch,
Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on
Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 57
(2010) (arguing that courts should analyze reverse settlements under the traditional rule of reason
analysis); John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, 11 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 1, 28–29 (2006) (same).
272. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1731 (“[A]pplication of
the rule of reason is not likely to tell us anything that we do not already know.”); Lemley &
Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 189, at 93 (noting that reverse payments are
presumptively anticompetitive).
273. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 67 n.210. See supra Part
I.C (explaining the rule of reason analysis method).
274. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1265, 1268 (reporting that after applying the rule of reason test, the court dismissed
eighty-four percent of cases because the plaintiff failed to show the defendant’s market share);
Graham, supra note 85, at 440 (noting the large evidentiary burden the rule of reason analysis
places on plaintiffs).
275. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–09 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasoning
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unique protection patent law provides, horizontal agreements between
pioneer drug manufacturers and generic competitors would be per se
illegal. 276 As stated above, these agreements are anticompetitive
because one party exits or delays entry into the market in exchange for a
cash payment, thus decreasing competition. 277 Accordingly, courts
should not apply the burdensome rule of reason test in reverse payment
cases. 278
Instead of applying the rule of reason analysis or per se illegality, the
Third Circuit properly treated reverse payment settlements as prima
facie evidence of anticompetitive behavior. 279 This position recognizes
the potentially severe anticompetitive effects of reverse payment
settlements. 280 Further, it follows the Supreme Court’s instruction that
antitrust analysis should mind the constructs of the regulated
industry. 281 Treating reverse payment settlements as prima facie

that horizontal payments are per se illegal); Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra
note 52, at 71 (“Of all the types of business activity, agreements by which competitors divide
markets threaten the most dangerous anticompetitive effects.”).
276. See Graham, supra note 85, at 430 (explaining that “the presence of patents alters the
antitrust analysis”); Lobanoff, supra note 7, at 1338 (noting the anticompetitive effects of reverse
payments).
277. In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 896; Graham, supra note 85, at 441.
278. See Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust, supra note 263 (reasoning that presumptive illegality
makes more sense in the reverse payment context); Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements,
supra note 52, at 67 (“Because these agreements are not generally pro-competitive in nature,
deferential review under the [r]ule of [r]eason is not appropriate.”).
279. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). See also Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 393 (2003) (arguing that courts
should treat reverse payment settlements as presumptively illegal).
280. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 68 (noting that reverse
payment settlements are particularly dangerous because of the “aligned incentives of the parties
and windfalls received by generics”). Carrier argues that treating reverse payment settlements as
presumptively illegal minimizes potential errors in antitrust analysis:
Courts committing Type I errors wrongfully punish lawful activity such as reasonable
payments on valid patents. Type II errors, in contrast, wrongfully allow illegal activity
such as excessive payments on invalid patents. In encouraging settlements and giving
effect to the presumption of patent validity, courts have sought to minimize Type I
errors. In the process, however, they have increased the frequency of Type II errors.
This is a mistake. The Hatch-Waxman framework was designed to encourage patent
challenges, reduce delay in entering the market, and promote generic competition.
Type II errors, in allowing parties to delay entry on invalid patents, fly in the face of
the Act’s text and intent. The Act’s preference for Type I errors confirms the propriety
of presumptive illegality.
Id.
281. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004) (considering the effect of a regulatory framework in selecting the appropriate analysis). In
Trinko, the Court reasoned that courts must carefully consider the “‘pervasive federal and state
regulation characteristic of the industry.’” Id. at 411 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91 (1975)). See generally Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and
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evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade respects the goals
articulated in the Hatch-Waxman Act because it favors competition,
while still recognizing the significance of patent rights. 282 Thus, the
Third Circuit correctly framed the antitrust analysis. 283
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has appropriately reflected the delicate
balance between patent law and antitrust law by allowing the antitrust
defendants to rebut the prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation by
showing that the payment: (1) was for a purpose other than delayed
entry, or (2) offered a procompetitive benefit. 284 The rebuttal option is
appropriate because, for example, a reverse payment could reflect the
parties’ reasonable expectations of litigation costs. 285 Also, the court
reasoned that the second rebuttal option would account for the instances
in which the reverse payment could increase competition. 286 This
option is appropriate because there are some (albeit rare) situations
where a reverse payment could increase competition among
pharmaceutical companies. 287
Although the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur properly balanced the
interests of innovation and competition in setting forth its reverse
payment settlement test, it failed to include any factors that would

Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 357 (2006) (expounding on the principles the Court
articulated in Trinko).
282. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1596 (“A settlement that contains a cash
payment or retention of exclusivity eligibility raises a ‘red flag,’ and an accompanying
presumption of illegality.”); Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust, supra note 263, at 26–31 (reasoning
that the presumption of illegality appropriately weighs the incentives of Hatch-Waxman).
283. See Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and
Urging Reversal at 22–24, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 102078, 10-2077, 10-2079) (arguing that the court should apply presumptive illegality to reverse
payments).
284. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). See Hemphill, Paying for
Delay, supra note 7, at 1596 (a rule making reverse payments presumptively illegal and allowing
rebuttal options “gives proper weight to the high likelihood of allocative harm arising from these
settlements, while leaving space for defendants, the parties best positioned to come forward with
justifications, to explain why the settlement is necessary to achieve some procompetitive end”).
285. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 76–77 (“A reverse
payment that does not exceed these costs does not present significant concern since the parties
would have been required to spend this money in any event.”). See also Hemphill, Paying for
Delay, supra note 7, at 1594–95 (reasoning that if the payment reflects reasonable litigation costs,
it may not be anticompetitive).
286. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. There are, in fact, some instances where a reverse payment
could have a procompetitive benefit. See generally Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura
Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19
ANNALS HEALTH L. 367 (2010) (arguing that patent settlements, including reverse payment
settlements, between brand and generic drug manufacturers can benefit consumers).
287. For example, consumers would benefit if a generic company on the verge of bankruptcy
received a cash payment that enabled it to avoid bankruptcy. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
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account for the parties’ reasonable assessment of patent validity. 288
Even though the Third Circuit focused on the scope of the patent’s
improper extension of the presumption of patent validity, the patent
does convey a patentee some exclusionary rights within the scope of a
valid patent. 289 Though the Third Circuit criticized courts applying the
scope of the patent test for ignoring the underlying patent suit, it too
ignores the underlying patent suit with its approach. 290 Although an
inquiry of the merits in an underlying patent suit is burdensome and
impractical, given the importance of the underlying patent validity,
courts should consider reasonable ways to incorporate a merits inquiry
into an antitrust analysis. 291
IV. PROPOSAL
This Part proposes that the Supreme Court resolve the circuit split
between In re K-Dur and Schering-Plough by accepting the Third
Circuit’s reasoning and concluding that reverse payment settlements are
prima facie evidence of anticompetitive conduct. 292 Further, this Part
recommends that the Court supplement the Third Circuit’s test by
allowing defendants in reverse payment cases to offer indicators of
patent validity as a way to show that the payment was for a purpose
other than delayed entry.

288. Id. Note that the court simply stated, “We agree, moreover, with the FTC that there is no
need to consider the merits of the underlying patent suit . . . .” Id. See Brief of the Federal Trade
Commission, supra note 283, at 26–27 (arguing that the court need not delve into the merits of
the patent validity).
289. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215. Some commentators note, “If the patent rights are valid,
the settlement is likely to be lawful because, . . . in that event[,] the settlement is [no] more
anticompetitive than a likely outcome of the litigation.” O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives
Approach, supra note 83, at 1781 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
290. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
679 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The Third Circuit criticized the scope of the patent test’s improper use of
the procedural presumption of patent validity, claiming that “[t]his presumption assumes away
the question being litigated in the underlying patent suit.” Id.
291. See Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1765 (proposing
alternative ways to address the uncertainty of patent validity); O’Rourke & Brodley, An
Incentives Approach, supra note 83, at 1781 (observing that because the validity of the patent is
often uncertain, courts must consider different ways to address this difficult issue).
292. The FTC has long sought Supreme Court review of this issue. See Protecting Consumer
Access to Generic Drugs: Hearing on H.R. 1902 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of
Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/070502
reversepayments.pdf (“We’ll continue to be vigilant in looking for ways to challenge
anticompeitive deals. It’s public knowledge that we’re looking to bring a case [to the Supreme
Court] that will create a clearer split in the circuits . . . .”).
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A. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Reasoning
from In re K-Dur
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by rejecting the
scope of the patent test and adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning in In
re K-Dur. 293 The Supreme Court should not apply the scope of the
patent test to reverse payment settlement cases because it lacks any
genuine antitrust scrutiny, wrongly assumes the patent in question is
valid, and counteracts the explicit goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 294
As the Court weighs public policy interests in reaching its decision, it
must recognize that reverse payment settlements have severe public
health consequences. 295 Allowing brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to pay generic manufacturers to delay market entry directly
impacts drug prices for American consumers. 296 The cost of health care
in the United States is already unsustainably high. 297 Expensive
prescription medications are a significant part of these costs, forcing
many patients to ultimately forego prescription drugs or to self-limit

293. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–18 (rejecting the scope of the patent test, balancing
policy interests, and finding reverse payments as unreasonable restraints of trade).
294. See Carrier, “Scope of the Patent” Test, supra note 139, at 5–8 (explaining the failures of
the scope of the patent test and praising the Third Circuit’s application of antitrust scrutiny);
supra Part III (revealing the failures of the scope of the patent test and arguing that the Third
Circuit’s reasoning was correct). As the Third Circuit noted, the scope of the patent test has
always led to a victory for antitrust defendants. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
295. See How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal Government Pay
More for Much Needed Drugs: Hearing on H.R. 1706 before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement
of FTC) (arguing that reverse payments harm American consumers and public health issues
require Congress to resolve the problem).
296. See Brief of American Antitrust Institute and 26 Professors, supra note 255, at 4
(explaining how high pharmaceutical costs impact consumers); Hemphill, Aggregate Approach,
supra note 236, at 636 (“[P]ay-for-delay settlement transfers wealth from consumers to drug
makers in the form of continued high pharmaceutical prices . . . .”); Oral Statement of
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Jan. 17 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071701oralstatement.pdf (“These increased
costs will burden not only individual consumers but also the federal government’s new Medicare
drug program, state governments, and American businesses striving to compete in a global
economy—like General Motors, which reports that employee health care costs add $1,500 to the
price of each car that rolls off its assembly line.”).
297. See Nirmita Panchal et al., Visualizing Health Policy, 308 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1197, 1197
(2012) (reporting that U.S. health care spending has risen over the past fifty years, rapidly
outpacing the economy); SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF HEALTH
CARE 1–4 (2009) (concluding that the rapidly rising cost of health care represents the most
significant threat to the long-term economic sustainability of workers and retirees); Christopher J.
Truffer et al., Health Spending Projections through 2019: The Recession’s Impact Continues, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1, 1 (2010) (reporting that health care costs in 2009 reached 17.3% of gross
domestic product and projecting that the trend will continue).
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their prescribed dosage. 298 When patients do not follow doctors’ orders
due to high costs, medical conditions worsen, leading to even more
dangerous conditions and expensive treatments. 299 Additionally, a
healthier population is a more economically productive population.300
While reducing health care costs would not be a valid reason alone to
condemn reverse payment settlements, given that the lower courts have
relied heavily on public policy support in reaching conclusions in this
matter, the Supreme Court should weigh all of the relative policies in
deciding which course to follow. 301 Therefore, in light of these
concerns, the Court should reject the scope of the patent test.
Instead, the Court should find that a reverse payment from a patent
holder to a generic patent challenger is prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade. 302 Settlement agreements that allow
brand-name manufacturers to pay generic manufacturers to delay
market entry essentially permit the brand-name manufacturer to enjoy a
temporary monopoly on the market. This monopoly divides the market
and stymies competition. 303 If the patent at hand is invalid, severe
anticompetitive harm results because there is seemingly no justification

298. Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8,
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (No. 06-830). See Thomas Rice &
Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate Utilization and Health Status: A
Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 415, 420, 427–28 (2004)
(finding the negative effects of cost-sharing on health outcomes, and the particularly expensive
and catastrophic results for seniors).
299. Brief of American Antitrust Institute and 26 Professors, supra note 255, at 4 (“Such
consumer-coping strategies expose patients to worsening symptoms, escalating medical
conditions, and even death.”); Rice & Matsuoka, supra note 298, at 420, 427–28 (observing the
adverse health outcomes resulting from not taking medications).
300. See P’SHIP FOR PREVENTION, HEALTHY WORKFORCE 2010: AN ESSENTIAL HEALTH
PROMOTION SOURCEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS, LARGE AND SMALL 7 (2001) (compiling studies
showing that a healthier workforce is a more productive one); Special Comm. on Health,
Productivity & Disability Mgmt., Healthy Workforce/Healthy Economy: The Role of Health,
Productivity, and Disability Management in Addressing the Nation’s Health Care Crisis, 51 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 114, 114 (2009) (“[A]n emphasis on the health of the workforce
is vital to the health of the economy[.]”).
301. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (noting the “long-standing policy in the law” favoring patent settlements); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasoning that the court
must encourage the most efficient resolution of costly disputes); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that patent litigation is especially
costly, time-consuming, and creates too much uncertainty).
302. See Brief of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 283, at 23–26 (advocating that
the court determine that reverse payments are presumptively unlawful).
303. See id. at 19–20 (“In the absence of countervailing considerations, such an agreement is a
plain violation of antitrust laws.”); Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at
71–72 (explaining the antitrust harm of reverse payment settlements); Hemphill, Aggregate
Approach, supra note 236, at 635 (explaining why reverse payments violate antitrust law).
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for the monopoly. 304 Market allocation, whether by geography or time,
can be the most dangerous anticompetitive activity because it deprives
consumers of any competition. 305 Even price fixing permits companies
to compete in the market on factors other than price. 306
A market allocation agreement, such as a reverse payment settlement,
is similar to a territorial market allocation agreement, which the
Supreme Court has categorized as a per se antitrust violation. 307 For
instance, in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., the Supreme Court applied
per se illegality to an agreement foreclosing competition between two
companies in a specified geographical territory, thus dividing the
market. 308 Similarly, reverse payment settlements allocate market
division to parties, but instead of allocating based on geography, they
allocate based on time. 309 While courts that find no antitrust violation
maintain that reverse payment settlements prevent only potential
competitors from entering the market, courts generally recognize that
the Sherman Act prevents monopolists from blocking certain or
“nascent, albeit unproven” competition. 310 Thus, the Court should treat

304. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 71–72 (highlighting the
antitrust concerns raised by reverse payments); O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives Approach,
supra note 83, at 1781–82 (reasoning that “if the patents are invalid or not infringed, the
settlement will most likely be unlawful” because it would create a monopoly).
305. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that “‘[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are
naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.’” Palmer v. BRG of Ga.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608
(1972)) (alterations in original).
306. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 71. “Price fixing is an
agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or
services are sold. It is not necessary that the competitors agree to charge exactly the same price,
or that every competitor in a given industry join the conspiracy.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRICE
FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO
LOOK FOR: AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/211578.pdf.
307. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 50.
308. Id. at 49–50. “Agreements among competitors are not exempt from scrutiny under the
Sherman Act just because a patent is involved.” Brief of the Federal Trade Commission, supra
note 283, at 20. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948)
(concluding that agreements to pool patents violated antitrust laws); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 282 (1942) (holding that patent agency agreements violated antitrust laws).
309. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 968–74 (2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056,
1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
[The settlement agreement] avoided the risks of litigation by entering into
agreements that allowed the companies effectively to divide the market. Exclusion
payments exclude competition no matter how weak or narrow a patent claim is—an
opportunity not provided by the patent system itself, under which weak patents can be
invalidated and narrow patents can be declared not infringed.
Brief of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 283, at 21.
310. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). See also
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reverse payment settlements as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint on trade rather than a per se violation due to the complex
nature of the patent’s potential exclusionary rights. 311
Finally, applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse payment settlements
will neither unduly prevent patent litigation settlements nor hinder
innovation because reverse payments are not essential to patent
litigation settlements. 312 An FTC study showed that between 1992 and
1999, fifty-seven percent of settlements between brands and generics
involved reverse payments. 313 Then, in 2000, the FTC declared its
intention to challenge these settlements. 314 Consequently, from 2000
through 2004, none of the twenty reported agreements involved a
reverse payment from a brand-name company to a generic drug firm.315
Instead, brand-name companies and generics settled by allowing early
generic drug entry through license arrangements, which did not stymie
innovation. 316 Yet, reverse payment settlements increased substantially
after the Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen Citrate courts sanctioned
the scope of the patent test. 317 Should the Supreme Court apply

12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 2030, at 213 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW]
(“[T]he law does not condone the purchase of protection from uncertain competition any more
than it condones the elimination of actual competition.”).
311. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 310, ¶ 2046, at 327 (claiming that
treating reverse payments as presumptively illegal works best to handle the reverse payment
problem); supra Part III.C (arguing that presumptive illegality is the most appropriate analysis to
handle reverse payment cases).
312. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 74–75 (2009)
(presenting evidence that reverse payments are not essential in settling disputes between brands
and generics).
313. FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG,
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY
2005, A REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 4 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf (noting that eight of
the fourteen payments during this time were reverse payments).
314. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, Mozelle
W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary, 65 Fed. Reg. 17506 (April 3, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoeschtandrxcommstmt.htm.
315. 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 313, at 4.
316. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 75.
317. In 2005, twenty-seven percent of settlements included reverse payment settlements,
rising to fifty percent in 2006. FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2006, A REPORT BY
THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 4 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMA
report2006.pdf. In 2007, forty-two percent of reported agreements included reverse payment
compensation. FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED
IN FY 2007, A REPORT BY THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION 3 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.
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antitrust scrutiny and hold that reverse payments are prima facie
evidence of unreasonable restraints of trade, brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical companies would likely find other legal (and not
anticompetitive) ways to settle patent infringement or patent validity
lawsuits. 318
In addition, contrary to the view of the Eleventh Circuit, restricting
reverse payment settlements would not “reduce the legitimate value of
the pharmaceutical patent rights.” 319 A patent conveys a right to “try to
exclude,” 320 not an absolute right to exclude. As noted above, courts
ultimately deem many patents invalid or infringed. 321 Thus, the reverse
payment confers a value greater than the true value of the patent—
guaranteed insulation from competitors in the market without the risk of
the patent being held invalid. 322 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning and conclusion in In re KDur.
B. The Court Should Outline Specific Factors for Lower Courts to
Consider in Analyzing Rebuttal Evidence by Defendants
In addition to embracing the Third Circuit’s test from In re K-Dur,
the Supreme Court should further outline specific factors for lower
federal courts to consider when evaluating the antitrust defendants’
rebuttal. 323 According to the Third Circuit’s test, antitrust defendants
may attempt to rebut the prima facie evidence of an unreasonable
restraint of trade by: (1) showing that the payment “was for a purpose
other than delayed entry,” or (2) offering “some pro-competitive
benefit.” 324 Though the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur determined that
evaluating the merits of the underlying patent suit was unnecessary, 325
whether the agreement violates antitrust law depends, in part, on
gov/os/2008/05/mmaact.pdf.
318. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Data analyzed by the
FTC suggest[s] that this [test] will leave the vast majority of pharmaceutical patent settlements
unaffected.”).
319. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1761–62.
320. Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 279, at 395 (arguing that patents are partial property
rights).
321. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 226, at 205–07 (determining that forty-six percent of
litigated patents are held invalid); Moore, supra note 203, at 390 (reporting that thirty-three
percent of fully litigated patents are held invalid).
322. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1761–62.
323. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218. Though the court thoroughly explained its reasoning
and reached a proper conclusion, it only offered guidance for the lower court by providing a test.
See id. This Section offers suggestions on how best to expand that test.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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whether the patent is valid. 326 The patent’s exclusionary power derives
from the scope of the patent and the chance of it being held valid or
infringed. 327 Thus, the Court should consider whether the patent itself
is valid. 328
In doing so, the Court should allow antitrust defendants to offer
indicators of patent validity, rather than fully exploring the merits of the
underlying patent. 329 Some scholars argue against patent settlements
because patent litigation is the only appropriate way to assess the scope
and validity of a patent. 330 Other authors suggest that a “trial within a
trial” is possible and that a court must consider whether the patent is
valid before reaching any antitrust claims. 331 However, the FTC and

326. See Graham, supra note 85, at 443 (noting that if the patent is valid and the agreement
does not extend beyond the patent, it does not violate antitrust laws); Hovenkamp et al.,
Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1735 (observing that the settlement could
potentially be legal if the patent is valid and the agreement does not extend the monopoly).
327. Several commentators support a limited inquiry into the patent merits. See Thomas F.
Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes
Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1789, 1795 (2003) (arguing that in certain circumstances, the antitrust analysis is ultimately about
whether the patent is valid); Crane, supra note 51, at 785 (“Where a preliminary injunction
motion has not been litigated, courts or agencies evaluating the competitive impact of an exit
payment settlement should make an abbreviated examination of the merits.”); Graham, supra note
85, at 443 (arguing that courts should undertake a limited inquiry into the merits of the patent);
Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1735 (“Permitting ex post
judicial queries into the validity and coverage of settled payments may sound onerous, and may
sometimes even be a deal breaker. But it is necessary in our ‘middle set’ of cases in order to
distinguish pro- from anticompetitive agreements.”); Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent
Settlements and Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST
68, 75 (2003) (arguing that the antitrust analysis must begin by measuring the patent); Shapiro,
Antitrust Limits, supra note 279, at 392 (reasoning that the courts should consider some limited
inquiry into patent validity).
328. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1735. See also Joseph
F. Brodley & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Preliminary Views: Patent Settlement Agreements,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2002, at 53 (“[A]ny precise identification of the antitrust risk would require
assessment of patent validity and scope.”). In fact, Judge Pooler’s dissent in In re Tamoxifen
espouses this view. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 228 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Pooler, J., dissenting) (“Of course, the strength of a patent must be central to any antitrust
analysis involving a patent.”). But see Abbott & Michel, supra note 265, at 22 (“[A]ny analysis
of whether a patentee’s exclusionary right includes the right to make exclusion payments and
preempts antitrust scrutiny of those payments must [consider] all characteristics and features of
patent policy including the probabilistic nature of the patent right at the time of settlements.”).
329. See Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1760 (“[W]e think
it important that the court make at least some limited inquiry into the merits of a settlement that
requires the defendant to exit the market.”). Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose, “The
infringement plaintiff can defend by showing both: (1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in
its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.” Id. at 1759.
330. Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 328, at 53.
331. McDonald, supra note 327, at 70–71.
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the majority of judicial opinions have expressed the view that antitrust
analysis should not involve an assessment of the merits of the
underlying patent. 332 The FTC has explained that inquiring into the
merits of the patent would be unreliable and not necessarily helpful
because the parties will have already settled the dispute and aligned
their interests. 333
Balancing these competing views, the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) has supported limited inquiry into the merits of a patent case
by examining the relative merits of the patent claims and circumstantial
factors surrounding the agreement. 334 Offering a way to implement the
DOJ’s approach, three prominent commentators—Herbert Hovenkamp,
Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley—recommend that courts do not need to
consider the merits of patent validity if: (1) the agreement would not
violate antitrust laws even without the intellectual property dispute, or
(2) if the agreement would be unlawful under antitrust laws even if the
patentee successfully defended the patent. 335
In the remaining
situations, where the lawfulness of the reverse payment agreement
332. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524–30
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 204–05; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003). See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 968 (2003),
vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Holman, supra note 6, at 559 (explaining the courts’
and FTC’s position on considering the merits on underlying patent suit). However, some
commentators have interpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Valley Drug as inquiring into
the merits of the patent dispute before reaching antitrust claims. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 8, In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006)
(No. 06–830) (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Notably, the petitioner only made this assertion in the introduction of the brief; it did not explain
where exactly in the Valley Drug opinion this alleged test appears and did not offer a pincite to
the location in the opinion of this test. Id. Professor Lemley, and other professors of economics,
law, and business make the same assertion in their amici curiae brief urging the Court to grant
certiorari in Tamoxifen. Brief for Professors of Economics, Business and Law as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 2, In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec.
16, 2006) (No. 06–830) (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294).
333. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 967–68. In addition, commentators point to
the FTC’s lack of technical proficiency to analyze the merits of a patent case. See Holman, supra
note 6, at 559 n.437 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s reversal of so many patent infringement
findings, even after the district court hears the full litigation, demonstrates why neither the FDA
nor FTC would have the capacity to make these decisions). Even the FDA refuses to consider
patent validity when listing drugs in the Orange Book. Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.95 (2012)
(explaining the process by which a generic drug company applies to the FDA when there is a
patent for the drug already).
334. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 11, FTC v. ScheringPlough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273).
335. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1725. See also Cotter,
supra note 327, at 1790 (evaluating the Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley approach and arguing for
a refined version); O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives Approach, supra note 83, at 1782
(describing and analyzing the Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley approach).
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depends on the lawfulness of the underlying patent, these authors argue
for a limited, non-exhaustive inquiry into the merits of the underlying
patent infringement suit. 336
Because fully analyzing patent validity would be overly burdensome
and potentially unreliable, allowing antitrust defendants to present
evidence of the patent’s validity offers a suitable middle-ground
approach. 337 Specifically, reverse payments allow courts to address the
issue by considering whether the reverse payment represents an
objective assessment of the patent’s value or an excessive payment to
delay market entry of a generic drug. 338 In its attempt to show that the
reverse payment is not solely intended to delay market entry, the brandname manufacturer could show that: (1) the payment was not higher
than litigation costs would have been, or (2) the payment was
reasonable based on the brand-name manufacturer’s business
assessment of the drug. 339
First, the brand-name pharmaceutical company could show that the

336. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1726, 1759–60. See
also Cotter, supra note 327, at 1792 (clarifying and criticizing Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley’s
approach).
337. See O’Rourke & Brodley, An Incentives Approach, supra note 83, at 1782 (concluding
that a limited inquiry approach is the best solution when patent rights are uncertain).
338. Reverse payments alert courts that the brand-name pharmaceutical company pays more
than the cost of litigation because the parties have aligned incentives.
Brand-name
pharmaceutical companies and generic manufacturers generally have aligned incentives because
the brand-name company can make more money by preventing the generic manufacturer from
entering the market than if the two competed in the market. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements, supra note 52, at 73. Naturally, the parties can make more money because they
decrease competition. In fact, the generic usually makes more money by settling than if it won
the patent infringement case and brought the drug to market, giving it strong incentives to file its
ANDA first and to settle. Id. However, in some situations, the parties’ interests do not clearly
align.
For example, if a generic pays a brand-name pharmaceutical company to enter the market under
a licensing agreement, the brand-name company desires higher royalties and the generic seeks
lower payments. These types of licensing agreements are not as likely to create antitrust harm.
Id. at 74. Another example involves agreement of the date of generic entry. In this scenario, the
brand-name company seeks late entry and the generic wants early entry. Hovenkamp et al.,
Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1762. The parties’ incentives may align more if
the generic prefers the certainty of an exclusivity period over early commencement. Hemphill,
Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1593. Distinctly, the reverse payments do not “offer any
deviation from wholly aligned incentives.” Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra
note 52, at 74.
339. See Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 76 (proposing these
rebuttal options for antitrust defendants). In many cases, the “patentee would not pay more than
its litigation costs unless it believed it was buying later generic entry than litigation would
provide.” Id. Conversely, a “naked cash payment flowing from the patentholder to the
challenger (in excess of avoided litigation costs) is a clear signal that the settlement is likely to be
anticompetitive.” Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 279, at 408.
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payment represented its objective assessment of the patent’s strength by
offering evidence that the payment did not exceed the likely litigation
costs. 340 If the reverse payment does not exceed litigation costs, the
reverse payment does not present antitrust concern because the parties
may have had to pay those costs anyway. 341 Litigation costs here
would include the party’s out-of-pocket costs and attorneys’ fees from
settlement until the end of the matter. 342 However, if the patentee were
willing to pay the generic drug company more than the costs of
litigation, the payment would suggest that the patentee is uncertain of
the patent’s validity or scope. 343
Second, antitrust defendants could demonstrate the reasonableness of
a payment by offering “evidence of sales projections, market analyses,
payments for similar products, and the brand’s interest in the product
and due diligence.” 344 For example, in Schering-Plough, the FTC
analyzed the reasonableness of a single specified rate. 345 After
exhaustively documenting the company’s lack of interest in the
transaction and finding that Schering’s licenses significantly exceeded
the value of the products it received in return, the FTC concluded that
the Schering agreement was an unreasonable restraint on trade.346
Following the FTC’s analysis in Schering-Plough, the parties would be
required to show that the justifications are plausible to be upheld. 347
Further, placing the burden on defendants to show that the payment
was reasonable is appropriate because defendants have access to the
necessary information. 348 Indeed, due to the increasing complexity of
340. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 76. See Shapiro, Antitrust
Limits, supra note 279, at 408 (“[S]uch payments are not necessarily anticompetitive if other
factors are brought into the analysis, such as risk aversion and asymmetric information about
market conditions, as ‘reverse cash payments’ may be important in more complex settings for
successful settlement.”).
341. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 7, at 1594–95.
342. Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1760 n.177.
343. Id. at 1757–58. Hovenkamp explains,
For example, a pioneer’s willingness to pay [ten percent] of its profits as an exclusion
payment to a generic rival suggests that the pioneer’s profit-maximizing price is at
least [ten percent] above its costs. That market power may well have been legally
conferred by an IP right, but the validity of that right is the very subject at issue in a
settlement case.
Id. at 1757 n.168.
344. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements, supra note 52, at 71–72.
345. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 36 F.T.C. 956, 1003–52 (2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056,
1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 963–66.
348. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per
Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 534–35 (2002) (arguing that the courts should place the burden of
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reverse payment settlements, plaintiffs and the FTC may have a difficult
time identifying and gathering data regarding the agreements.349
Therefore, as a part of the antitrust defendant’s attempt to prove that the
reverse payment’s intent was not simply to delay market entry, it may
offer evidence that: (1) the payment did not exceed litigation costs, or
(2) the payment represented a reasonable, objective assessment of the
patent’s validity.
CONCLUSION
Though antitrust law and patent law are fundamentally at odds, they
both seek to improve consumer welfare through competition and
innovation. 350 By treating reverse payments as presumptively illegal,
the Supreme Court can strike the proper balance between these two
conflicting areas of law and reach these shared goals. 351 While antitrust
law prohibits brand-name drug manufacturers from paying generic drug
manufacturers large sums of money to delay generic drug entry,
allowing patent holders to prove that the payment was for something
other than delayed entry recognizes the exclusionary power of the
patent. 352 Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur offers
proof on the antitrust defendants due to their access to relevant information); Hovenkamp et al.,
Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 232, at 1733–34 (observing that antitrust defendants will
be in a better position to offer evidence of patent validity).
349. Commissioner Thomas Leary has also noted that placing the burden of proving invalidity
and non-infringement on antitrust plaintiffs, such as the FTC, is impractical because the FTC
lacks the institutional capability to make such determinations. See Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust
Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part II, 34 J. HEALTH L. 657, 661–62
(2001). However, some argue that placing the burden on antitrust defendants is inconsistent with
the procedural presumption of patent validity in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). See
Cotter, supra note 327, at 1796 n.40; Kevin D. McDonald, Patent Settlements and Payments That
Flow the “Wrong” Way: The Early History of a Bad Idea, 15 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON.
4, 12–13 (2002) (arguing that placing the burden of proof on the patent holder contradicts the
Patent Act). Instead, Thomas Cotter suggests,
A court could resolve this tension, however, by concluding that the statutory
presumption was intended to apply in patent infringement actions only, and not in other
settings; to hold otherwise might undermine the equally important federal policies
embedded in the antitrust laws. In addition, or alternatively, a court could incorporate
the statutory presumption into the analysis by requiring the patent plaintiff/antitrust
defendant to prove that it would have prevailed in the patent infringement action in
light of, inter alia, the statutory presumption.
Cotter, supra note 327, at 1795 n.40 (citing Blair & Cotter, supra note 348, at 533).
350. See Crane, supra note 51, at 748 n.1 (“It is generally recognized that antitrust and patent
law, although polar opposites in their treatment of monopolies, share common objectives.”).
351. See supra Part III (arguing that the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur properly weighed policy
interests and employed sound legal reasoning to reject the scope of the patent test, and treated
reverse payments as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraints of trade).
352. See supra Part IV (explaining why the Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s
test).
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the Supreme Court a clear opportunity to rule on reverse payment
settlements. The long-awaited Supreme Court decision in Actavis will
have significant implications given the split among the circuit courts
and skyrocketing health care costs in the United States.

